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 Abstract 
In Mind and World John McDowell proposes to exorcise ‘some characteristic anxieties of 
modern philosophy’ that make the relation between mind and world seem problematic. 
According to McDowell, we are confronted by two strong but contrary intuitions when it 
comes to explaining the relation between mind and world. On the one hand, we are faced with 
a coherentism that threatens to leave the mind out of touch with the world, and on the other, 
we are confronted with the intuition that justification for our beliefs is simply given in 
experience. However, although McDowell’s book has been at the centre of philosophical 
discussion since its publication in 1994, there are aspects of his philosophy that seems 
difficult to fit together, and which, even today, poses challenges for even the most 
sympathetic reader. How are we to reconcile McDowell’s interesting suggestion that 
experience is already conceptual, thereby exorcising the apparent problem of mind’s relation 
to the world, with his quietism? And what is McDowell committed to with his claim that the 
content of our experience is conceptual? I discuss the first of these questions in essay I, 
whereas the second – what McDowell takes the debate on nonconceptual content to be about 
– is addressed in the second essay, distinguishing it from other conceptions in play in an 
increasingly ramified debate. However, the question that governs McDowell’s inquiry in 
Mind and World – how the mind is related to the world – is not a new question to McDowell, 
but runs like a red thread through his philosophical career. In Mind and World the question is 
addressed primarily in its specific epistemological variant, ‘how can experience justify 
beliefs?’, but the question of mind’s relation to the world also crops up in his earlier works on 
semantics. In some of these early, influential articles on semantics, McDowell queries the 
relation between mind and world by asking how there can be de re senses. My third essay 
takes a look at McDowell’s reading of Frege and Russell, and how it can be said to constitute 
an alternative way of dispelling the problems posed by the opposing intuitions, represented by 
coherentism and the Myth of the Given, in explaining the relation between mind and world.  
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Introduction 
 
In Mind and World John McDowell sets out to explain how we can avoid being worried 
about a defining problem of modern philosophy, a problem that, in spite of its age, 
appears to persist unabatedly in contemporary philosophy of mind, namely: how can our 
minds be related to the world? In its epistemological variant, the problem arises out of a 
dualism, which McDowell, following Donald Davidson, describes as a dualism of 
conceptual scheme and content, or, in his preferred phrasing, scheme and Given. In brief, 
the dualism presents us with the following predicament: in thinking about the relation 
between minds and world we seem faced with a pair of contradictory thoughts; on the 
one hand, it appears that our experiences must be able to justify our beliefs if we are to 
claim that the content of our thought is related to the world, and on the other, we are 
faced with the equally persistent thought that it is simply impossible for experience to 
stand in a justificatory relation to our beliefs. Fully developed, as McDowell says, the 
combination of these two intuitions about mind’s relation to the world represents an 
antinomy; two lines of thought that cannot be made to cohere. However, as long as the 
incompatibility of these two thoughts remains inexplicit in one’s thinking, “one [will] 
find oneself asking: “How is it possible for there to be thinking directed at how things 
are?”1 One will, in other words, persist in trying to answer the question, to bring an end 
to this ‘intolerable oscillation’, or endless ‘seesaw’ between the two horns of the dualism, 
which, whose background, “if made explicit, would purport to reveal that the question’s 
topic is actually not possible at all.”2 Rather than embarking on the futile project of 
attempting to answer this unsolvable oscillation McDowell seeks therefore to undermine 
the common conception of mindedness-in-nature shared by both intuitions which makes 
the problem seem pressing, and in so doing, unmask the dualism as nothing but an 
illusion that can be done away with. As he says, “If we can achieve a way of seeing 
things in which there is after all no tension there, the question, taken as a way of 
                                                 
1
 McDowell 1996: xiii. 
2
 McDowell 1996: xiii. 
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expressing that philosophical puzzlement, should lapse; that needs to be distinguished 
from its seeming to have been answered.”3 
That is not to say that we can easily free ourselves from the seemingly mandatory 
thoughts driving the oscillation: the intuitions on both sides are strong, and McDowell 
wants “to respect the conviction that the obligations are genuine, even while we see how 
we can, for our own part, reject the appearance that we are facing a pressing intellectual 
task.”4 Rather than dismissing the dualism out of hand, therefore, the unstable conundrum 
presents the backdrop to which the whole book develops – as an illusory problem, whose 
proper understanding would make visible a way out – and McDowell returns to it 
repeatedly throughout the lectures of Mind and World in framing his discussion on the 
relation between mind and world. A basic understanding of the motivating problem 
seems therefore essential in coming to grips with how McDowell thinks we can avoid 
being caught up in a fruitless oscillation between the two horns of this dualism, and in the 
ensuing section of my introduction I seek to provide a sketch of the dilemma as it is set 
out in that work. 
In Mind and World McDowell probes a specific epistemological version of the 
question of how the mind is related to the world, but that must not lead us astray in 
equating his overall aim with that specific epistemological phrasing of the problem. 
McDowell finds dualisms at many levels of our thinking, species of a generic question 
that seeks to answer how our thought can have objective content, or, as McDowell says, 
“how [it can be] that exercises of a spontaneity bear on a reality outside the sphere of 
thinking at all.”5 Although it is only through the specifically epistemological, semantical 
etc. versions of the problem that we can address the more general worry, these species of 
the question must not be equated with the generic problem. It is vital that we do not let 
this distinction – and McDowell’s moving between them – escape us, if we are to 
understand his approach to the questions that preoccupies him. I briefly expound on the 
difference between the generic and the specific versions of the problem that occupies 
McDowell in a second section of this introduction, before rounding-off my introduction 
with a brief outline of the essays making up the body of this thesis. 
                                                 
3
 McDowell 1996: xxi. 
4
 McDowell 1996: xi. 
5
 McDowell 1996: 15. 
 3 
I. The Dualism 
So how do we get a more substantial grasp on the problem facing us? In the later 
appended introduction to Mind and World, McDowell suggests that, ”A good way into 
the picture I offer is to consider the plausibility of a minimal empiricism”6 – a thought, or 
intuition, which will constitute one of the horns in the dualism McDowell is about to 
draw up. The train of thoughts that coaxes us into a minimal empiricism gets started by 
noting, as McDowell does, that, “To make sense of the idea of a mental state’s or 
episode’s being directed towards the world, in the way in which, say, a belief or 
judgement is, we need to put the state or episode in a normative context.”7 A belief or a 
judgement is directed towards the world in being ‘stances’ or ‘postures’ that are 
“correctly or incorrectly adopted according to whether or not things are indeed thus and 
so”8, as there would be no saying what the belief or judgement was a belief or judgement 
about unless it could be correctly or incorrectly adopted according to how things were in 
the world.9 And it seems similarly plausible to impose that requirement on all other 
content-bearing stances. As McDowell says, “If we could make sense of judgements or 
beliefs as directed towards the world in that way, other kinds of content-bearing postures 
or stances should easily fall into place.”10 
But this immediately gives rise to a related thought: as our access to the empirical 
world11 goes through our experiences, it seems that the only way our thinking could be 
answerable to the world is for it to be answerable to experience. For, as McDowell says, 
invoking a Quineian jargon, how could a claim that our thinking is answerable to the 
empirical world be made sense of unless it meant answerable to the “tribunal of 
experience”; unless thought is correctly or incorrectly adopted according to experience? 
“This”, as McDowell says, “is what I mean by a “minimal empiricism”; the idea that 
                                                 
6
 McDowell 1996: xi. 
7
 McDowell 1996: xi. 
8
 McDowell 1996: xi. This is, of course, what is meant by placing something in a normative context. 
9
 As Barry Stroud says, in drawing up the dualism that makes up McDowell’s starting point: “The troubling 
reflections start from the idea that thought has a subject-matter, or is about something, only if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. One such requirement is found in the idea of truth. A belief or judgement to the 
effect that things are thus and so is correctly or incorrectly held according to whether or not things are thus 
and so.” (Stroud 2002: 79). 
10
 McDowell 1996: xii. 
11
“In addressing this question [i.e. how our thinking is answerable to the world], we might restrict our 
attention, at least tacitly, to thinking that is answerable to the empirical world; that is, answerable to how 
things are in so far as how things are is empirically accessible.” (McDowell 1996: xii.)  
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experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to 
how things are, as it must be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all.”12 However, 
far from explaining how mind is related to the world, this thought merely instigates a 
suspicion, or an opposing thought, which, as soon as we think we have found peace in a 
minimal empiricism makes its presence known. 
McDowell introduces this converse thought by considering a passage from Wilfrid 
Sellars, where Sellars draws up the distinction between placing an episode or state in a 
interconnected ‘space of reasons’, i.e., placing it in a “normative context [which] is 
necessary for the idea of being in touch with the world at all”13, and giving it an 
‘empirical description’. In contrast to placing a thought in a normative space of reasons, 
giving a state or episode an empirical description is, as McDowell says, “to coin a phrase 
that is Sellarsian at least in spirit”14, to place something in the space of nature – or, as he 
immediately adds, to “situate it in the realm of law.”15 This, he remarks, makes Sellars 
conception of an empirical description come close to the way we think of explanations 
and descriptions employed in the natural sciences of today, but as he adds; 
 
“what matters for Sellar’s point is not … [the] positive characterisation [of the two ‘spaces’], but the 
negative claim: whatever the relations are that constitute the logical space of nature, they are different in 
kind from the normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons. The relations that constitute 
the logical space of nature, on the relevant conception, do not include relations such as one thing’s being 
warranted, or – for the general case – correct, in the light of another. That is what Sellars is saying when he 
insists that “empirical description” cannot amount to placing something in the logical space of reasons.”16 
 
But as McDowell says, if placing something in the space of nature, on Sellars’s 
understanding, is incompatible with taking part in the logical space of reasons, where in 
these two ‘spaces’ do we want to place experience? 
The question brings out the force of the dualism, for if we choose to see experience 
in the terms employed by the modern sciences – as “impingements by the world on a 
                                                 
12
 McDowell 1996: xii. 
13
 McDowell 1996: xiv. 
14
 McDowell 1996: xiv. 
15
 McDowell 1996: xv. 
16
 McDowell 1996: xv. 
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possessor of sensory capacities”17, thereby locating it in the logical space of nature – we 
have excluded experience from the ‘space of reason’, which leaves it unable to act as 
justifications for our beliefs. But that was precisely what we required of experience in the 
first place in order for it to be able to put mind, or thought, in contact with the world. 
Minimal empiricism encouraged the thought that we could conceive of experience as a 
‘tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are’. But, as we 
have just seen, experience understood as impingements from nature does not have the 
normative character to endow thoughts with justification of how things are in the world – 
nature does not ‘include relations such as one thing being correct in the light of another’. 
Or, as Barry Stroud says in laying out McDowell’s dualism,  
 
“to understand two things as connected in accordance with a law of nature is not to understand one of 
those things as making the other reasonable in any way, or as justifying or supporting it. It is to see that one 
thing happens because something else happens, but not to see that one thing is correctly or incorrectly 
executed, or is warranted or justified in the light of something else.”18 
 
So as long as we choose to conceive experience under the heading of nature 
conceived as the realm of law, justification seems therefore ruled out. As McDowell 
concludes; “if we conceive experience as made up of impressions, on these principles it 
cannot serve as a tribunal, something to which empirical thinking is answerable.”19 This 
conclusion, however, is intolerable, and we are led back to reconsider whether brute 
experience cannot nevertheless, although it does not involve a normative context, yield 
justification for our beliefs – only to have it confirmed that the demand is absolute, and to 
find ourselves in the middle of the dreaded seesaw, oscillating back and forth between the 
two horns of the dualism. 
The same considerations feature centrally in the first lectures of Mind and World, 
though in a different jargon. Here, McDowell puts the issue in Davidsonian or Kantian 
terms, describing the dualism, as was briefly noted above, as a dualism of conceptual 
scheme and content. The change of language does not alter the issue although it adds 
some points to the truncated version presented in the introduction, but more importantly: 
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 McDowell 1996: xv. 
18
 Stroud 2002: 79-80. 
19
 McDowell 1996: xv. 
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in introducing the dualism here, in the main body of the book, McDowell starts from a 
different end of the problem; from an approach that immediately makes visible his 
favoured dissolution of the predicament facing us. Rather than beginning with the horns 
of the dualism, he sets out from the Kantian insight, which he seeks to put in their place20 
– that mind, or thought, is related to the world through our employment of concepts in 
experiencing. Or, in the Kantian language in which he often phrases that idea: “the fact 
that thoughts are not empty, the fact that thoughts have representational content, emerges 
out of an interplay of concepts and intuition.”21 From there, the Kantian view is defended 
by ‘working back’ so to speak, by showing that any alternative attempts to explain the 
relation between mind and world would inevitably lead us straight into the dizzying 
oscillation discussed above. 
Starting from the Kantian requirement of what it is for a thought to have empirical 
content just noted,22 McDowell observes that, for Kant, the active use of concepts; the 
understanding, or spontaneity – in other words: the space of reasons – is constituted by 
freedom. “In a slogan”, as he says, “the space of reasons is the realm of freedom.”23 
However, as was similarly visible in Sellars’s later remarks, this contains the kernel of a 
potentially destabilising thought. For, if the space of reasons is without external 
constraints, thinking would seem to loose its grip on the world. Or as McDowell says, in 
working back to an expression of the one horn of the dualism the Kantian insight is 
supposed to overcome: 
 
“If our freedom in empirical thinking is total, in particular if it is not constrained from outside the 
conceptual sphere, that can seem to threaten the very possibility that judgements of experience might be 
grounded in a way that relates them to a reality external to thought.”24 
 
The Kantian dictum, which McDowell so often reverts to – and which seems to sum 
up his own view as well – that: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
                                                 
20
 As he says, ”One of my main aims is to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our 
discussion on the way thought bears on reality.” (McDowell 1996: 3) 
21
 McDowell 1996: 4. 
22
 In fact, for a thought to be a thought simply is for it to have empirical content: “for [a thought] to lack 
what I am calling “representational content” [i.e. empirical content] … would be for it not really to be a 
thought at all, and that is surely Kant’s point” (McDowell 1996: 4). 
23
 McDowell 1996: 5. 
24
 McDowell 1996: 5. 
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concepts are blind”25, is supposed to safeguard us from this threat. However, the 
inclination to think with Sellars, that relations in the space of nature is of a different kind 
from those in the space of reasons, and that only that which falls within the space of 
reasons can act as justification for our beliefs – thereby excluding experience, as 
understood in the terms of the modern natural sciences, from providing justification for 
our beliefs – is strong. 
The theorist who receives the dubious honour in Mind and World of exemplifying 
someone who embraces this horn of the dualism, is Donald Davidson26, in whose 
thinking “what we wanted to conceive as exercises of concepts threaten to degenerate 
into moves in a self-contained game”27, or as McDowell says elsewhere, “a frictionless 
spinning in the void.”28 In Davidson’s closed-up coherentist conception of the conceptual 
realm, “experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility”29, and 
so, although it “is causally relevant to a subject’s belief and judgements, … it has no 
bearing on their status as justified or warranted.”30 
In the end, however – and as we now have come to expect – the intolerable result of 
coherentist positions, such as Davidson’s, leads us naturally to want to endorse the 
opposite pole of the dualism, which in the lectures is described as the thought that 
justification for our beliefs is simply given in experience, a mere pointing to “bare 
presences that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical 
judgements.”31 The driving intuition is, as we saw above, that experience somehow must 
be able to justify beliefs on pain of making the mind’s relation to the world unintelligible, 
and the leading idea is that we can make, 
                                                 
25
 McDowell 1996: footnote 3, page 5. 
26
 “In the lectures that follow, it is mainly Donald Davidson that figures in the role I have here cast Sellars 
in: as someone whose reflection about experience disqualifies it from intelligibly constituting a tribunal. 
For these purposes, Sellars and Davidson are interchangeable.” (McDowell 1996: xv-xvi). Whether or not 
McDowell gives a fair interpretation of Davidson does not seem to be of great importance to my project, 
which is to understand certain aspects of McDowell’s philosophy, in which Davidson figures as a 
representative of a position that is at least thinkable. The following will not rely on a correct interpretation 
of Davidson, and I will therefore let McDowell’s reading stand unquestioned. 
27
 McDowell 1996: 5. 
28
 McDowell 1996: 11. 
29
 McDowell 1996: 14. 
30
 McDowell 1996: 14. This seems to be the fate of all coherentism: “Such theories [i.e. coherentist 
theories] express precisely the unnerving idea that the spontaneity of conceptual thinking is not subject to 
rational constraint from outside. Coherentist rhetoric suggests images of confinement within the sphere of 
thinking, as opposed to being in touch with something outside it.” (McDowell 1996: 15). 
31
 McDowell 1996: 24. 
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“the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extend more widely than the conceptual 
sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-conceptual 
impacts from outside the realm of thought.”32 
 
However, once more the seesaw tips the other way and we see that if experience is 
conceived as impingements on a sensory system, the idea that this can somehow provide 
us with justification appears mythical – it is the Myth of a miraculously-Given 
justification in brute experience, which Sellars, among others, has made implausible. 
And, as McDowell adds to the above quote,  
 
“we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as 
relations within the space of concepts: relations such as probabilification, which hold between potential 
exercises of conceptual capacities. The attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the 
conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do.”33 
 
Impaled on this horn of the dilemma we find Gareth Evans, whose view, according 
to McDowell, “fall into the Myth of the Given with its confusion of justification and 
exculpation”34 by mistaking causal impingements for full-blown justificatory relations. 
Although it may be difficult to accept that the Myth of the Given is a myth, as McDowell 
says, he argues that the idea that experience can be described in terms of causal 
impingements on our sensory organs cannot be made into a justificatory relation. As 
McDowell repeats throughout: “it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground 
that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite 
another thing to have a justification.”35 
Much of the first two lectures take the form of drawing up the two positions 
constituting this dualism, and to demonstrate their respective inadequacies. Instead of 
either of the two suggestions here deplored, McDowell suggests, as we have briefly seen, 
that we follow Kant in understanding experience as consisting in an interplay between 
spontaneity and receptivity, between concepts and bits of experiential intake. Against the 
                                                 
32
 McDowell 1996: 7. 
33
 McDowell 1996: 7. 
34
 McDowell 1996: 14. 
35
 McDowell 1996: 8. 
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coherentist-side of the dualism, we want to avoid isolating the mind from the world, to 
allow experience to play a justificatory role for our beliefs; and against those clutching to 
the Myth, we must insist that anything that aspires to play the role of a justifier must have 
the correct justificatory form, must belong to the space of reasons. As McDowell says, 
“A genuine escape would require that we avoid the Myth of the Given without 
renouncing the claim that experience is a rational constraint on thinking.”36 Or in an oft-
quoted passage, invoking a Kantian phrasing of the same: that we come to see that 
“receptivity does not make an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation 
[between receptivity and spontaneity].”37 In short: that we see experience as already 
conceptual. However, as has already been noted, and which seems to come out 
perspicuously in the second-last quote above; the kind of solution we are talking about is 
an escape, a way out of the dilemma, rather than something which charts a path in 
between the two horns of the dualism. In seeing things straight, “we can find a way to 
dismount from the seesaw.”38 
 
II. Generic versus specific phrasings of the dualism 
According to McDowell, the question of how experience can justify beliefs is a species of 
the generic question, ‘how does mind relate to world?’. As he says in the introduction to 
Mind and World,  
 
“The recoil to the Given that results from this worry – whether in its generic form (how can it be that 
exercises of spontaneity bear on a reality outside the sphere of thinking at all?) or in its specifically 
epistemologically form (how can it be that exercises of spontaneity amounts to knowledge?) – is a natural 
response to the very sort of “coherence theory of truth and knowledge” that Davidson recommends.”39 
                                                 
36
 McDowell 1996: 18. 
37
 McDowell 1996: 9. 
38
 McDowell 1996: 9. 
39
 McDowell 1996: 15. I had the good fortune to meet McDowell in person during a conference in Uppsala 
26. – 29. September, where he confirmed to me that he thought of the dualism of mind and world as a 
genus with different species of the problem falling under it, and that the generic question could be ”solved” 
(in the sense of ’dispelled’) from any of its specific version. However, it may perhaps not be entirely clear 
what this ammounts to, and an example may prove helpful in seeing how a question may be posed at a 
generic and at a specific level and to bring out the difference between the two ways of posing the question. 
The dictionary account of a genus, taking an example from biology, is that a genus is ”a grouping of 
organisms having common characteristics distinct from those of other such groupings. The genus is a 
principal taxonomic category that ranks above species and below family” (New Oxford American 
Dictionary, second edition). This means that in asking e.g. what a dog is, one would be asking a question at 
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At the generic level, the question takes the form of a dualism of a familiar kind; an 
ancient dualism stemming from Descartes which leaves us struggling to explain the 
relation between mind and world, oscillating between the opposing, and mutually 
exclusive intuitions that, on the one hand, mind and world must be interacting, and on the 
other, that they cannot be so interacting. As McDowell says in “Singular Thought and the 
Extent of Inner Space”: “The feature of the classically Cartesian picture to focus on is the 
effect I have already mentioned, of putting subjectivity’s very possession of an objective 
environment in question.”40 The problem receives its peculiarly threatening form in 
Descartes’ turn inwards,41 and as McDowell notes, “Once we are gripped by the idea of a 
self-contained subjective realm, in which things are as they are independently of external 
reality (if any) … our problem is not now that our contact with external world seems too 
shaky to count as knowledgeable, but that our picture seems to represent us as out of 
touch with the world altogether.”42 
In Mind and World, however, the question is mainly addressed in its specific 
epistemological form, and many commentators that have criticised McDowell’s proposed 
solution to the dilemma he here draws up – that we see concepts as already implicated in 
experience – have stayed at this level of the discussion.43 However, the specific forms in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the generic level, i.e., at the level in which all the differences between individual kinds of dogs are 
abstracted, and we are left with a description that draws a picture of the whole genus. However, if we were 
to investigate what a dog is, we would have to choose a particular specimen of a species of dogs: we would 
have to pose the question e.g. by studying close-up a specific German shepherd dog, and only through 
studying the specific German shepherd dog would we come to know what a dog is. It is not possible to 
study the genus itself, but only indirectly, through its species. I believe we must understand the distinction 
between McDowell’s over-arching generic question: ’how can mind be related to the world’, and the 
specific questions he asks; ’how can experience justify beliefs’, and ’how can there be de re senses’, as, 
respectively, an epistemologic and semantic species of the generic question. They are species of the same 
generic category of questions dealing with the relation between mind and world, but at a lower level of 
abstraction. And in the same way as in the dog-example, the generic question cannot really be answered 
except from studying the species that it comprises, i.e., except from solving it at the specific level. In essay 
III, I try to re-construct McDowell’s way of solving the generic question from his writings in semantics. 
40
 McDowell 1986/1998: 250. 
41
 “We arrive at the fully Cartesian picture with the idea that there are no fact about the inner realm besides 
what is infallibly accessible to the newly recognised capacity to acquire knowledge.” McDowell 
1986/1998: 241. 
42
 McDowell 1986/1998: 241. Once more, at issue is not McDowell’s exegesis of Descartes but the 
plausibility or thinkability of the problem. 
43
 Gregory McCulloch seems to be one of the few exceptions, saying that “a pervasive if somewhat under-
remarked theme of McDowell’s work is that this preoccupation with the epistemology is superficial, since 
knowledge … presupposes that we can direct our minds at, think about, the empirical world.” (McCulloch 
2002: 123.) 
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which the dualism is posed, seems almost inessential to McDowell’s objective writ large, 
viz. to explain how the mind can be in contact with the world, but are primarily probed as 
ways of solving the generic question, and it seems that it is in virtue of contributing to 
solving the generic form that they have their interest.44 As he says, 
 
“It is true that modern philosophy is pervaded by apparent problems about knowledge in particular. 
But I think it is helpful to see those apparent problems as more or less inept expressions of a deeper anxiety 
– an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves mind simply out of 
touch with the rest of reality, not just questionably capable of getting to know about it. A problem about 
crediting ourselves with knowledge is just one shape, and not the most fundamental, in which that anxiety 
can make itself felt.”45 
 
This feature of McDowell’s philosophy – that he poses the question of mind’s 
relation to the world at a generic level, as well as at specific levels falling under this 
genus – has tended to be overlooked. But it seems that it is only once we are sensitive to 
this fluctuating between the generic and specific level of addressing the issue that we can 
properly make sense of his quietism. Once we see his question of how experience can 
justify beliefs as simply one way of carving out a place for mind in nature – from a 
specific epistemological perspective – it seems more plausible to hold that by showing 
the possibility of such a standing, he is not thereby committed to the further project of 
turning this possibility into a full-blown epistemological theory. And showing the 
intelligibility or possibility of such a standing; that there is no reason to see the mind-
world relation as a mysterious, that there is really no problem in how we can be so related 
once we discard the flawed line of thinking behind the Myth of the Given and 
coherentism, can, it seems, be done merely by undermining the frame of thought making 
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 To follow up with the example from above: If I am wondering about what a dog is, i.e., I am wondering 
about the genus ’dog’, and I investigate a German shepard dog in order to find out what a dog is, I am only 
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in the epistemological question in so far as it solves the generic question of how the mind is related to the 
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explanation, or theory, but this would come in conflict with his quietism (cf. Essay I). Cf. with note 43, 
above. 
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 McDowell 1996: xiii-xiv. Similarly, a few pages into lecture I on he says that, “I have modulated into 
talking about how the idea of the Given figures in a thought about the grounding that entitles some 
empirical judgements to count as knowledgeable. But this explicitly epistemological idea is 
straightforwardly connected with the more general idea I began with.” (McDowell 1996: 6.) Which was, as 
we have seen, to consider “the way concepts mediate the relation between mind and world.” (McDowell 
1996: 3).   
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this standing seem impossible. A specific project, going beyond merely situating the 
mind in a rational relation to nature, would require ‘constructive philosophy’. But as 
McDowell is not in the business of giving an epistemological theory, it seems that simply 
making it intelligible how mind can stand in a rational relation to the world require no 
more than a quietist showing of how this is plausible. However, as noted, as many 
commentators seems to overlook this sliding between the two levels of explanation, they 
have tended to take him to make a proposal as to how it can be that we can have 
knowledge – something which surely would require a theory, making a quietist attitude 
seem out of bounds. Though, once we see the question of how experience can justify 
beliefs as a species of the generic question of how we can be in touch with the world, 
simply remaining quiet on any positive account seems to be an approach that is accessible 
to McDowell. 
 
III. The essays 
Having briefly considered the two horns of the dualism McDowell seeks to overcome, 
and mentioned an important distinction between the generic and specific variants of the 
question that governs McDowell’s inquiry, we have charted a necessary background 
needed in order to assess some aspects of McDowell’s philosophy more directly. As 
noted, much of Mind and World takes the form of an argument against the Myth of the 
Given and coherentism, showing them to leave us in an intolerable dualism. 
Nevertheless, McDowell’s tentative way out of the impasse, his notion of a ‘second 
nature’ which comes through a re-consideration of naturalism in favour of a ‘relaxed 
naturalism’ or ‘naturalized platonism’, appears to conceal an immensely rich suggestion 
that is left in its bare, unsatisfying outline. The idea draws on Aristotle’s ethics and Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s idea of a ‘human mode of life’, and has caused many commentators to 
claim that McDowell needs to go much further in elaborating his idea than he does – that 
he cannot simply revert to quietism having engaged with material and drawn upon 
philosophers which takes us in a direction that seems to invite rather than decline further 
elaboration. In essay I, I consider some of the challenges that has been raised against 
McDowell’s claim not to be doing any ‘constructive philosophy’, his notion of ‘second 
nature’, and how sensitivity to the generic question – of which the question of how 
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experience can justify our beliefs is a species – nevertheless seems to allow for a quietist 
approach. It seems that if we take McDowell’s interest to lay primarily with the generic 
version, he has merely to show the intelligibility of his alternative naturalism, and is not 
thereby committed to developing an epistemological theory. 
A different challenge has been mounted by Crispin Wright, who claims that there is 
room for an alternative to McDowell’s option in between the horns of the dreaded 
dilemma – which, if plausible, would undermine McDowell’s invocation of the right to 
adopt a quietist approach as there would now be two suggestions on the table and no 
telling which one to adopt apart from the strength of the arguments in their favour. 
Wright claims that McDowell does not even consider the view he proposes, but I believe 
he does, and that he raises an objection which would push Wright into committing 
himself to the existence of nonconceptual content, thereby falling under the Myth-side in 
McDowell’s schema. 
The second essay addresses an issue that seems largely overlooked among 
philosophers who criticise McDowell’s claim that our experience is conceptual, namely, 
what McDowell actually takes this to mean. Or differently put: what McDowell takes the 
debate on nonconceptualism versus conceptualism to be a debate about. A number of 
opponents to the idea that experience is conceptual standardly set out by attributing the 
claim that experience has only conceptual content to McDowell, without further inquiry 
into what McDowell takes himself to be committed to in Mind and World. McDowell has 
become a sort of ‘default conceptualist’, the standard opponent to a variety of different 
theories of nonconceptual content. But without a proper understanding of what he takes 
the debate to about, many of the numerous suggestions that experience has a 
nonconceptual content seems to miss the debate fundamentally with respect to what 
McDowell is claiming. However, as McDowell’s proposed solution to how our 
experience can justify our beliefs (the specifically epistemological version of the generic 
question of how we can occupy a rational standing in nature) is precisely that our 
experience is conceptual, the issue seems to be of the greatest importance in 
understanding Mind and World. In my second essay, I outline three different ways the 
idea that experience has a nonconceptual content has been developed, contrasting it with 
what I believe McDowell takes to be at stake in the debate. 
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The claim that our experience is conceptual, is, as discussed in essay I, left to a 
somewhat peculiar philosophical method of simply showing itself, in the failure of 
existing alternative suggestions. In essay III, I explore another of McDowell’s attempts at 
dispelling the generic version of the dualism: his semantic works, starting from Frege and 
Russell. It seems that in his reading of these philosophers we find what may be 
characterised as a constructive attempt at solving a semantic version of the generic 
question. Although not set out in the same systematic way as in Mind and World, the 
solution that can be gathered from some of his articles dealing with semantic issues 
seems both to constitute a more detailed and more satisfying way of explaining how we 
can stand in a rational relation to nature. This does not solve the specifically 
epistemological phrasing of the dualism, which we encountered in Mind and World, but it 
does seem to present a good case for how to overcome the generic dualism from a 
semantic point of view. However, in the end, taking this to constitute a constructive 
solution to the generic problem seems to undermine McDowell’s quietism, and although 
tempting, if we are to respect McDowell’s quietism it seems that we must bracket the 
elaborate suggestion he here draws up – that we must interpret it not as an attempt at 
doing constructive philosophy.46 
All three essays seeks to respect McDowell’s quietism, by paying attention to the 
distinction between a generic and specific level at which the question that runs like a 
thread through McDowell’s work – ‘how does mind relate to the world?’ – can be posed, 
while at the same time seeking to bring out some of McDowell’s substantial 
philosophical claims and insights. “Quietism”, as McDowell says of Wittgenstein, “is not 
just a quirk of his philosophy.”47 Nor does it seem to be for McDowell. 
                                                 
46
 This may be disappointing, as McDowell appears to draw up a complete account of how we can have de 
re senses (the semantic version of the generic problem), only to, indirectly, recant it, by saying that he is 
not in the business of doing constructive philosophy. But it seems difficult to hold someone to making a 
substantial view when they simply revert by saying saying ’no, I am not doing constructive philosophy’. 
47
 McDowell 1996: 94-95. 
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Essay I. McDowell’s Quietism 
 
I. Introduction 
In the opening line of Lecture I of Mind and World, McDowell states that his aim in the 
book is to “consider … the way concepts mediate the relation between minds and the 
world.”48 Two lines below, he seems to expound minimally on his envisaged solution to 
that problematic relation, when he adds that; “One of my main aims is to suggest that 
Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on 
reality.”49 According to McDowell, as we have seen, Kant’s clear-sightedness consisted 
in seeing that ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind’, and much of the ensuing discussion seems designed to defend or make plausible 
this claim, which in non-Kantian terms translates into McDowell’s pivotal claim in Mind 
and World, that our experience is conceptual. In a sweeping summary of the first section 
of Lecture I he appears to outline a thesis that stands in need to be defended: 
 
“So the picture is this: the fact that thoughts are not empty, the fact that thoughts have representational 
content, emerges out of an interplay of concepts and intuition.”50 
 
This seems suspiciously much like a substantial philosophical claim, a claim that, as 
the above quote seems to suggest, will be vindicated by showing how Kant should still 
hold a central place in our thinking on the mind-world relation. However, whereas the 
first section of Lecture I may plausibly be taken to set up the issue as a search for a 
solution to the vexing question of how our minds are related to the world, the appended 
introduction to the second edition of the book frames the overall objective somewhat 
differently. Here McDowell claims that his aim is to, 
 
 “propose an account, in a diagnostic spirit, of some characteristic anxieties of modern philosophy – 
anxieties that centre, as my title indicates, on the relation between mind and world. Continuing with the 
medical metaphor, we might say that a satisfactory diagnosis ought to point towards a cure. I aim at 
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 McDowell 1996: 3. 
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 McDowell 1996: 3. 
50
 McDowell 1996: 4. 
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explaining how it comes about that we seem to be confronted with philosophical obligations of a familiar 
sort, and I want the explanation to enable us to unmask the appearance as illusion.”51 
 
The message is repeated towards the end of McDowell’s introduction, with 
McDowell arguing that “there is no prospect of answering the question [concerning the 
relation between mind and world] as it was putatively meant.”52 A thought, which leads 
him to conclude that: 
 
“So if I am right about the character of the philosophical anxieties I aim to deal with [i.e. that they 
cannot be answered], there is no room for doubt that engaging in “constructive philosophy”, in this sense, is 
not the way to approach them. As I have put it, we need to exorcise the questions rather than set about 
answering them. Of course that takes hard work: if you like, constructive philosophy in another sense. And 
of course that is what I offer in this book.”53 
 
However, if McDowell’s objective is not to engage in constructive philosophy, how 
do we make it fit with the opening of lecture I, which at least appears to promise a 
solution to the relation between mind and world in the form of a substantial philosophical 
thesis – a thesis whose positive claim is that Kant should be reintroduced in our 
theorising about the mind-world relation? For the Kantian-inspired claim that 
‘representational content emerges out of an interplay of concepts and intuitions’ at least 
seems like something which would classify as a substantial claim on the relation between 
minds and the world. 
But the issue is further complicated by the ambiguity of the above quote, for 
McDowell openly says that exorcising the questions on the mind-world relation takes 
hard work and ‘constructive philosophy in another sense’. But how are we to understand 
‘constructive philosophy in another sense’? Is there a viable intermediate position here, 
or is the reference to ‘constructive philosophy in another sense’ merely revealing of a 
tension between McDowell’s official quietism and an actual, substantial line of argument 
set out in Mind and World? 
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 McDowell 1996: xxiv. 
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II. Disbelief and shrugged shoulders 
A number of commentators have found McDowell’s quietist proclamations hard to 
swallow. To some it just seems like an incredible claim that McDowell’s rich and 
interesting work should make no pretensions at explanation – “belied though it is by his 
actual practice”54, as one commentator says; to others, his profession of quietism is 
incoherent with his deep and attentive engagement with the philosophical tradition laying 
behind the dualism that occupies much of his work.55 It seems simply disingenuous to opt 
for quietism when one has taken the traditional philosophical attempts to deal with the 
issues as seriously as McDowell has. However, in addition to the grappling with how to 
make sense of McDowell’s claim that he is not engaged in constructive philosophy, there 
is also the question of whether quietism is even a possibility for him: has McDowell 
really exhausted the space of possibilities by juxtaposing his own view to coherentism 
and the Myth of the Given? 
Michael Friedman starts by noting how McDowell’s approach to the dualism that he 
seeks to surpass is deeply informed by the history of philosophy; that the modern 
phrasing of the dualism in terms of scheme and content is, in McDowell’s work, aligned 
with the long tradition in western philosophy of addressing the mind-body problem. 
However, it does not escape Friedman that McDowell’s primary use of this tradition is as 
a means of dispelling the intrinsically uncomfortable dualism inherited from Descartes – 
although he appears to do so from within that tradition. As he says, “The kind of 
exorcism at which McDowell aims thus requires an internal engagement with the 
tradition rather than the merely external “debunking” characteristic of Richard Rorty’s 
work.”56 However, herein lies also the problem, as Friedman sees it. For whereas 
Wittgenstein’s quietism consisted of a “deliberate step back from any explicit 
engagements with the philosophical tradition”57 in favour of a “method of exploring the 
limits of language from within”58, McDowell’s engagement with the history of 
philosophy seems rather to place him in a succession of philosophers – including 
Aristotle and Gadamer, whom McDowell discusses favourably – who have focused on 
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 Friedmann 2002: 48. 
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 Friedmann 2002: 29. 
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 Friedmann 2002: 48. 
58
 Friedmann 2002: 48.
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practical knowledge and “empirically given linguistic cultural traditions”59 as a way of 
explaining how we can be directed towards the world.60 Rather than quietism – which, as 
Friedman argues, may make sense only in a Wittgensteinian detached stance towards the 
tradition and its solutions – McDowell’s work appears thus as continuing a tradition 
debating how best to explain our openness to the world, and thus to represent a theory on 
the mind-world relations which thereby defeats its own claim not to engage in 
constructive philosophy.  
In a similar vein, Charles Larmore argues that McDowell has “In reality … 
embarked upon the construction of a comprehensive theory of mind and world”61. In 
distinction from Friedman though, Larmore maintains that, due to insufficient attention to 
what it is for something to be a reason, McDowell’s theory fails to show how “experience 
can be a tribunal”62 justifying our beliefs, and in the end, that McDowell’s quietism “only 
blinds him to the problems he has yet to face.”63 However, Larmore seems to retain a 
prejudice towards quietism, independent of what he sees as the failed attempt by 
McDowell of occupying that position. As he says,  
 
“Wittgenstein’s quietism has been enormously influential, despite the inescapable paradox that 
manifestly lies at its heart. For how, we must ask, can showing up the mistaken assumptions underlying 
some philosophical problem amount to anything other than putting better views in their place? And must 
not these views be of a similar scope and thus provide the makings of a positive theory of the phenomena in 
question?”64 
 
To Larmore, “Montaigne provides a better model than Wittgenstein”, quoting 
Montaigne as saying that, “There is no end to our inquiries … It is a sign of narrowness 
of mind when the mind is content, or of weariness.”65 However, it would be somewhat 
ungenerous to read McDowell from such an entrenched disbelief in the method he 
attempts to employ – to not even try to understand McDowell’s claims on its own terms. 
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Moreover, as McDowell concedes in his response to Larmore, “Interesting philosophical 
afflictions are deep-seated. Even after temporarily successful therapy, they re-emerge, 
perhaps perennially, in new forms.”66 Being a quietist does not mean that one has found a 
way of eliminating the pressure from philosophy once and for all: “The impulse finds 
peace only occasionally and temporally.”67 
Larmore’s bleak view of the possibility of quietism aside, one of the harshest 
criticisms – subsequently met with one of the sharpest replies on McDowell’s part – have 
come from Crispin Wright, who claims that McDowell fails to take account of the 
possibility of an alternative position in between the two horns of the dualism. Wright 
argues that the ‘commonsensical suggestion’ he envisages ”is so salient that I find it hard 
to believe that McDowell does not somewhere intend to speak directly to it.”68 And 
surely, if there is a plausible alternative view, McDowell cannot quietly sit back and let 
his preferred view simply show itself – conceptualism would then no longer be vindicated 
by being the only view left standing after having undermined coherentism and the Myth 
of the Given. If Wright can plausibly make the case that there is room for an alternative 
understanding of how experience can justify our beliefs it would indeed pose a serious 
threat to McDowell’s quietism. For unless, as Wright says, his alternative suggestion of 
how experience can justify beliefs is “open to decisive objection”, 
 
“much of the dialectical progression of the first half of Mind and World is undercut. McDowell’s 
proposal, that we should regard it as intrinsic to experience that it draws on the very conceptual resources 
involved in active, self-critical thought, will be supererogatory; we will be able to dismount from the 
seesaw without it”69  
 
But can we conceive of such a view in the face of McDowell’s extensive efforts to 
categorize most of modern philosophy as falling to either of coherentism or the Myth of 
the Given? Wright argues that there is an alternative on the side of what McDowell 
deems mythical – and that he passes it by due to a “failure to characterize the targeted 
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error sufficiently sharply.”70 As he says in the response to a response, “McDowell sees no 
space between the ideas that experience is a brute Given – blind intuition with nothing to 
say – and his own preferred conception that it essentially draws on the passive exercise of 
conceptual capacities. But there is, of course, intermediate space.”71 
 
III. Wright’s objection 
Wright considers two objections to McDowell’s solution. The first objection questions 
what appears to be McDowell’s requirement that experience must be able to justify in a 
way similar to the relation of inferential justification that holds between beliefs. As he 
says, 
 
“McDowell proceeds as though in such a case [i.e. in perception] experience has to take over 
something akin to the role played by belief in inferential cases: that non-inferential justification differs from 
inferential only in that the justifier in not a belief but some other content-bearing state. Call this the quasi-
inferential conception of empirical justification. Generalized, the quasi-inferential conception would have it 
that each of our justified beliefs are justified by its relation to an antecedent something-that-P.”72 
 
The second worry Wright raises “contrasts with the foregoing by retaining the quasi-
inferential conception, and granting McDowell that the justificatory potential of 
experience depends upon its being received as a carrier of content”73, i.e. that experience 
must be received as conceptual in order to play a justificatory role.74 Wright then goes on 
to argue that “the idea that in order for experience to have this potential, the very having 
of it demands the exercise of conceptual capacities”75 is an extra, non-mandatory claim 
on McDowell’s part. In fact, he argues, we can easily see how the last requirement can be 
circumvented while conceding McDowell the first. 
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The motivating thought behind seeking a solution that refrains from taking onboard 
this latter claim is the argument from children and animal experience; that if we impose 
such strict restrictions on what it is to have an experience, we exclude animals and young 
children from having experiences, as they cannot be said to possess concepts. However, 
taking his stand does not mean that we are back in the dreaded seesaw, according to 
Wright. He thinks we can avoid impaling ourselves on either horn of the dualism, 
 
“if it is allowed that an experience of the outer world, while not itself ontologically dependent upon an 
actual exercise of conceptual capacities, is intrinsically such as to carry the information, for a suitably 
conceptually endowed creature, that P.”76 
 
Having an experience is, on Wright’s suggestion, not dependent upon conceptual 
capacities, but it has, as he says on the following page, “the intrinsic potential to 
command a certain conceptual response from a suitably endowed thinker”77; i.e. it has the 
potential to act as a justifier for a concept-possessing creature, without, as he adds “that 
such a response is constitutive of its very being [an experience of that kind].”78 In giving 
content to his idea this way, Wright explicitly sets himself apart from Gareth Evans’s 
claim that we, in perceiving, encounter informational states with a nonconceptual content, 
which, in serving as input to a concept-possessing creature can be transformed into 
conceptual states. Evans’s view seems to imply that the conceptual response, on Wright’s 
terms, is constitutive of its being an experience,79 but the important part is that Wright 
claims to be able to stay neutral on the question of nonconceptual content – which makes 
it unintelligible to him why McDowell does not even consider this way of dispelling the 
dualism. Surely the commonsensical view – which saves the experiential lives of young 
children and animals – is to see experience as concept-independent, while at the same 
time providing those possessing concepts with an ‘intrinsic potential’ of forming a 
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conceptual response? According to Wright, McDowell’s requirement that experience 
demands the possession of concepts is nothing but a supposition. As he says, McDowell 
 
“does not dismiss the idea that something is “given” in experience: he believes in a conceptual given 
– what he regards as mythical is, rather, the notion of a given which is both justificatory and “independent 
of conceptual abilities.” He does not argue for this incompatibility but just asserts it, and I do not know how 
he would rebut an awkward customer who just counter-asserted that “occurrences in consciousness that are 
independent of conceptual capacities” can justify.”80 
 
However, a quietist would not really find Wright or his awkward customer 
particularly worrying, but is a ‘shrug of the shoulder’ – McDowell’s offer – an acceptable 
response, or has Wright sketched a view that proposes a plausible way to bridge 
McDowell’s dilemma without invoking the possession of conceptual abilities – in which 
case mere shoulder-shrugging will not do?81 
It is difficult to see exactly what Wright’s suggestion is, as he does not present much 
of an elaboration of his view – except from saying that experience has the potential to 
command a certain conceptual response from a concept-possessor. However, taking into 
account that Wright is concerned to bring young children and animals into the fold again, 
a natural way of taking his words would be that he holds something along these lines: that 
we share sensitivity of our surroundings with children and animals, and that, viewed thus, 
an experience would be an experience of something-that-P to both me and the dog, 
although only I, having concepts, could use that something as the further justification for 
my belief that P. Such an interpretation seems to fit nicely with saying that experience 
commands a certain conceptual response from concept-users, while not equating the 
experience with the actual employment of concepts on the part of the concept-possessor. 
However, if I did form a belief based on the experience, that would be as a result of the 
‘intrinsic potential’ inherent in experience to ‘command of me a certain conceptual 
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response’ – which seems to come close to saying that having an experience is a 
disposition to form a belief (on the part of concept-possessors). Such a view would 
furthermore be neutral on whether or not the content received in experience was 
nonconceptual or not, which was what Wright claimed on behalf of his suggestion. 
However, if this is Wright’s view, it is a view that McDowell does seem to discuss – 
and which he curtly dismisses as falling under the Myth of the Given. As he says, 
 
“It is not that actual operations of conceptual capacities first figure only in actualizations of 
dispositions to judge, with which experiences are identified – so that experiences is connected with 
concepts only by way of a potentiality. Having things appear to one a certain way is already itself a mode 
of actual operations of conceptual capacities.”82 
 
This seems directly to address and dismiss Wright’s suggestion, whose claim is that 
when I judge, that is to give the conceptual response that experience has commanded of 
me – i.e. it is the actualization of my potential to judge – and it is only then that concepts 
are invoked. (Although, as we saw; even in the absence of such a commandment of 
experience, the experience would be an experience of something-that-P.) However, the 
point is not that McDowell here presents new, strong arguments to undermine Wright’s 
suggestion – once again, McDowell seems merely to state his view – only that he does 
discuss Wright’s suggestion, and dismisses it as belonging to the Myth-side of the 
dualism. As such, it cannot be claimed that McDowell simply overlooks this possibility, 
but that he thinks the view Wright presents falls once one sees the issue under discussion 
in its proper light: i.e. that such a view does not enter from outside the scope of 
possibilities he considers, but can be dismissed of as Mythical, and therefore dealt with 
through a quietist approach. The flaw that Wright’s view suffers from – an objection that 
does not affect a view taking concepts as already operating in experience – is that, 
 
“when there is an inclination to make a judgement of experience, the inclination seems to float 
mysteriously free of the situation, taking on the look of an unaccountable conviction that some concept 
“has application in the immediate vicinity”.83 
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Wright’s scarcely developed suggestion seems to be open to precisely that objection 
– that there is nothing that explains why I am compelled into judging that P, and not 
some other proposition, by the experience I am entertaining, unless, that is, we hold that 
experience comes with a nonconceptual content, which would then determine how my 
conceptualization of that content turned out. But if the latter were the case, Wright would 
clearly fall on the Myth-side in McDowell’s set-up of the dualism, and that was a stance, 
as we have seen, on which he explicitly wanted to remain neutral.84  
 
IV. Second nature and constructive philosophy in a different sense 
So are we to take McDowell’s word for it, that he can properly be described as not 
involved in constructive philosophy, and moreover, that he seems justified in his 
quietism, having narrowed the range of plausible solutions in between coherentism and 
the Myth of the Given to his own?85 
There is of course a sense, as he says, in which he is engaged in constructive 
philosophy: criticising the Myth of the Given and coherentism is supposed to clear the 
ground for a proper understanding of how we can avoid being baffled by the 
incompatible pair of pressing intuitions leading us into the dualism in the first place. A 
scrutiny of McDowell’s work reveals that his approach often takes the shape of 
undermining frameworks which he sees as impeding philosophical insights, and Mind 
and World is no exception in this respect. As he says towards the end of the lecture on 
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nonconceptual content: “If one fails to see that conceptual capacities can be operative in 
sensibility itself, one has two options [i.e. coherentism and the Myth of the Given] … My 
point is that we need not confine ourselves within this framework of possibilities.”86 It 
seems therefore that if we take into account this ‘destruction of frameworks’ as a vital 
part of his philosophy, we have a perfectly good sense in which McDowell can claim to 
be engaged in a ‘constructive philosophy in a different sense’. 
Nevertheless, at times it seems as McDowell goes beyond the self-imposed, 
restrictive mandate that he professes to be adhering to, and in lecture V we find him 
saying that, 
 
“At the end of my second lecture (§8), I said that if we take Kant’s conception of experience out of the 
frame he puts it in, a story about a transcendental affection of receptivity by a supersensible reality, it 
becomes just what we need. Outside that frame, Kant’s conception is a satisfactory way to avoid our 
dilemma, the apparently forced choice between the Myth of the Given and a coherentism that renounces 
external constraints on thinking.”87  
 
McDowell seems here to be proposing more than a destructive program, rather he 
seems clearly to be saying that if we adopt Kant’s conception of experience outside his 
framework of a ‘supersensible reality’ we see our way through the dilemma. And it is 
difficult to understand this move other than as a substantial philosophical suggestion – a 
suggestion, which appears to become further substantiated when he on the following page 
adds that, “Kant’s lack of a pregnant notion of second nature explains why the right 
conception of experience cannot find a firm position in his thinking.”88 In fact, the 
notions of a ‘second nature’ and Bildung appear very much like components of a 
substantial philosophical theory, and seem to play an increasingly important role as the 
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book progresses and as coherentism and the Myth of the Given has been put to rest in the 
opening lectures.89 
The idea of a second nature is first introduced in lecture IV, when McDowell 
attempts to tackle head-on an assumption common to coherentists and those subscribing 
to the Myth of the Given alike; “a deep-rooted mental block that produces this 
uncomfortable situation”90, as he says. The impediment that prevents philosophers – of 
which Evans and Davidson are held up as examples – from even considering the idea that 
concepts are implicated in experience91, starts from the thought that we share perceptual 
sensitivity to our surroundings with mere dumb animals. There seems quite intuitively to 
be a sense in which we share ‘first nature’, as McDowell later says, with many of our 
fellow animals, and that our ‘spontaneity’, or concept-possession is a feature of our 
experience best explained as an additional, on top of that common basis of perceptual 
sensitivity. But that merely serves to underline the commonality between dumb animals 
and us. As he says, “Sentience is a feature of animal life, and it should be something 
animal in our case too.”92 However, if sentience belongs to nature it may be difficult to 
see how to get concept-possession into the picture. “How”, as McDowell rhetorically 
asks, “could the operations of a bit of mere nature be structured by spontaneity, the 
freedom that empowers us to take charge of our active thinking?”93 The worry is prone to 
leads us straight into the space of available options that Davidson and Evans find 
themselves in – a set of options that places us squarely on the road towards the dreaded 
seesaw. 
The root of the problem springs from a conception of nature, which may, as 
McDowell says, seem ‘sheer common sense’, but which, as we will see, he thinks we 
need to reconsider when it comes to giving an account of our human situatedness – our 
place as minded beings – in the world. It is the most natural thing for us to think of nature 
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in terms of objects describable in the terms of the natural sciences, interacting according 
to physical laws – in short: to conceive of nature as a realm of law. However, the thought 
that the space of reasons was to be distinguished from a law-governed physical nature is a 
product of modern scientific thinking, and as such a radical break with and liberation 
from the medieval conception of nature as ‘filled with meaning’ – “as if all of nature 
where a book of lessons for us”94. Now, it is not that McDowell sees the modern 
conception of nature as in itself worthy of criticism, or that he longs for a return to the 
medieval conception of nature – it is not that he advocates a “regress into a pre-scientific 
superstition, a crazily nostalgic attempt to re-enchant the natural world.”95 As he says, “it 
is a mark of intellectual progress that educated people cannot now take that idea [of a 
world ‘filled with meaning’] seriously, except perhaps in some symbolic role.”96 But this 
‘disenchanted’ nature – in Weber’s now commonplace image – leaves the door open to 
the line of thought from which Evans and Davidson starts, and which McDowell 
describes as the mental block that prevents them from perceiving a way out of the 
captivating dualism they find themselves in: if we demarcate the realm of nature from the 
space of reasons we make an eventual rational interaction between the two unintelligible. 
And it is the “placing [of] things in a logical space that is sui generis, by comparison with 
the realm of law”97 that effects the block that prevents us from seeing how our sensitivity 
to nature and our conceptual abilities can interact.  
Operating within the modern scientific framework in trying to given an account of 
human mindedness in nature leaves us, according to McDowell with three options. On 
the one hand – on what McDowell dubs ‘bald naturalism’ – one can staunchly bite the 
bullet and claim that there is nothing over and against the natural, and that 
‘intentionality’, ‘meaning’ and ‘content’ is reducible to objects that can be given a purely 
scientific description. On this view, “we can reconstruct the structure of the space of 
reasons out of conceptual materials that already belong in a natural scientific depiction of 
nature.”98 So conceived, there is really not a major problem of explaining how content or 
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meaning comes to have a place in a strictly scientific understanding of nature. True, there 
might be lots that remain before we actually have that one-to-one translation of what we 
normally see as falling under the space of reasons into purely physical terms, but that is 
no reason to despair of the project. ‘Bald naturalism’ is therefore, as McDowell says, “a 
style of thinking that would simply dismiss the fuss I have made over spontaneity.”99 
The second option, which together with the third option McDowell goes on to 
sketch, distinguishes itself from ‘bald naturalism’ in that it “holds that the contrast that 
poses our difficulties, the contrast of logical spaces, is genuine.”100 The first of the two 
options is McDowell’s own preferred solution of seeing concepts as already implicated in 
experience. In danger of being misinterpreted to express a revisionary longing for a re-
enchantment of nature, however, this view “requires that we resist the characteristically 
modern conception according to which something’s way of being natural is its position in 
the realm of law.”101 This is in fact the crux of the matter, for as he goes on to say “The 
third [set of options] diverges in just that respect.”102 This third set of responses accepts 
that the space of reasons cannot be reduced to the space of nature, and indeed, sharply 
demarcates the realm of nature from the space of reasons. But it also equates the realm of 
nature with the realm of law, and it is the latter idea that leads Mythists and coherentists 
alike into the pickle.103  
If we set aside ‘bald naturalism’, it is this – the patent incompatibility between a 
realm of nature, interpreted as a realm of physical laws, and the space of reasons – that 
should motivate us to look for a new understanding of nature, an understanding which 
must somehow free it of its, so to speak, ‘overly modern’ constraints.104 However, in 
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saying that much, the burden seems to be on McDowell to provide us with an alternative 
to the view of nature that he here rejects; a view that explains how nature can be seen as 
different from the realm of law, and at the same time, a suggestion that avoids being a 
‘crazily, nostalgic attempt to re-enchant the natural world’. But how, exactly, is this to be 
imagined? 
McDowell is unfortunately rather sketchy on this important question, although the 
work that remains seems at least fairly clearly cut out for us from the preceding 
discussion of the faults of ‘bald naturalism’, and the naturalism Evans and Davidson 
embraces: what we need to do is to rethink our ‘actualization of our nature’, come up 
with a new naturalism, so to speak, that brings “responsiveness to meaning back into 
operations of our natural sentient capacities as such, even while we insist that 
responsiveness to meaning cannot be captured in naturalistic terms, so long as 
“naturalistic” is glossed in terms of the realm of law.”105 
However, as McDowell notes, “This can easily seem to commit us to a rampant 
platonism”106: the idea that the space of reasons is not natural at all, that it, on the 
contrary, belongs to a kind of ‘inhuman’ or non-human structure which would make it 
look “as if we are picturing human beings as partly in nature and partly outside it.”107 So 
conceived, the space of reasons would look more like a ‘supernaturalism’, as McDowell 
comments, rather than something which could properly be labelled under the heading 
“naturalism” in that it would not really have anything to do with the natural. But we are 
not obliged to equate the space of nature with the realm of law, and we are therefore not 
forced to “interpret the claim that the space of reason is sui generis as a refusal to 
naturalize the requirements of reason.”108 There is still room for a naturalized space of 
reasons, as long as we do not equate nature with law, and without that entailing that we 
tip over into a ‘rampant platonism’. As McDowell says, 
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“Exercises of spontaneity belong to our mode of living. And our mode of living is our way of 
actualizing ourselves as animals. So we can rephrase the thought by saying: exercises of spontaneity belong 
to our way of actualizing ourselves as animals. This removes any need to try and see ourselves as peculiarly 
bifurcated, with a foothold in the animal kingdom and a mysterious separate involvement in an extra-
natural world of rational connections.”109 
 
McDowell finds a model for this way of conceiving nature in Aristotle’s ethics – 
although, it is perhaps best to say: in a somewhat unorthodox reading of Aristotle, which 
denies attributing to him a kind of ‘bald naturalism’ as ‘historically monstrous’. 
According to McDowell, Aristotle cannot – in contrast to how many modern 
commentators tend to read him – be credited “with aiming to construct the requirements 
of ethics out of independent facts about human nature.”110 Instead, we must see Aristotle, 
according to McDowell as saying that ethical questions are something that can be dealt 
with from within an ethical standpoint. It is not that we can take a ‘sideways-on’ view of 
ethical questions – and in the prolongation: a sideways-on view of the space of reasons – 
that would be accessible from “facts that could be in view independently of the viewer’s 
participation in ethical life and thought”111. On the contrary, ethics only comes into view 
because the viewer occupies an ethical position; it is only from the space of reason that 
something can be a reason. The connection between Aristotle’s discussion on ethics and 
the space of reasons can be made explicit if we enrich his discussion of ethics, for our 
purpose, so as “to include a proper place for reflectiveness.”112 As such, as McDowell 
says, the thought can be put thus: 
 
“The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not we are 
responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When 
a decent upbringing initiate us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence 
of this tract of the space of reasons.”113 
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The view of nature that is here sketched is supposed to steer clear of the inherent 
flaws of ‘bald naturalism’ and ‘rampant platonism’, both of which, each in their own 
ways, makes a rethinking of the concept of nature impossible: the first, by equating 
nature with the realm of law; the second, by pushing the space of reasons forever out of 
nature’s reach and into a ‘supernatural’ sphere. In wishing to construe his view as a 
version of naturalism, while distancing it form the above, corrupted forms, McDowell 
speaks of the conception of nature he here draws up sometime as a “relaxed naturalism” 
or a “naturalized platonism”, thereby emphasising that it is a conception of nature which 
makes room for a standing in the space of reasons. The standing we thus acquire is a 
standing in nature which comes about through an upbringing, or an ‘initiation’ into a 
space of reasons, as part of  “what it is for a human being to come to maturity.”114 And 
the “resulting habits of thought and action” from this upbringing – from this Bildung – as 
he says, “are second nature”115: a view of nature that allows us to see how spontaneity 
can be inextricably implicated in receptivity. 
 
V. Quietism revisited 
The suggestion McDowell offers is supposed to soothe us into seeing how there can be a 
naturalism that does not prohibit a standing in the space of reasons. However, this sketch 
still appears to leave the most important thing to be explained out of the picture: how, 
precisely, can a ‘decent upbringing’ present us with a second nature, a standing in the 
space of reasons? Surely, this important question of what it is to acquire a second nature 
cannot be left to such scanty remarks as “having one’s eyes opened to reasons”116 through 
the appropriate Bildung? Or less metaphorically; that Bildung “actualizes of some of the 
potential we are born with.”117 Without further explanation, the transformation that is 
supposed to take place in Bildung risks looking nothing short of mysterious – in spite of 
McDowell’s assurances that “nothing occult happens to a human being in ordinary 
upbringing.”118 
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However, contrary to what one would think, this is precisely what McDowell claims 
we can. According to McDowell, we are fully justified in leaving the nature of second 
nature to such incomplete remarks, as it is not supposed to represent ‘a bit of constructive 
philosophy’. In contrast to what one may have thought when the idea was first introduced 
– as a proper conception of nature that would rectify the inadequacies of ‘bald 
naturalism’ and the naturalism embraced by Evans and Davidson – McDowell’s 
introduction of second nature is meant only to, 
 
“dislodge the background that makes such questions look pressing, the dualism of reason and nature. 
It is not meant to be a move – which could at best be a first move – in constructing a response to that 
question.”119 
 
Rather, as McDowell argues: “The phrase serves only as a shorthand for a 
“reminder”, an attempt to recall our thinking from running into grooves that make it look 
as if we need constructive philosophy.”120 The nature of the space of reasons is therefore 
not really a question to be answered at all, and faced with the demand that we spell out 
the precise structure of the space of reasons as it comes out in a relaxed platonism, we are 
entitled to simply remain quiet, inert, and unmoved by implorations. Or as McDowell 
says, “the response we should aim at being entitled to, if someone raises a question like 
“What constitutes the structure of the space of reasons?”, is something like a shrug of the 
shoulders.”121 In fact, trying to answer the question would lead us into the fruitless and 
fatiguing seesaw that Evans and Davidson finds themselves in, and it is only by 
developing a notion of second nature that we can break the circle. 
However, in invoking the notions of Bildung and second nature McDowell seems to 
set his foot on a path that demands that he say more than he is officially willing to. The 
richness and complexity of human society, of communication, and of such thick concepts 
as ‘tradition’ and Bildung, which McDowell puts into play with increased frequency 
towards the end of the book, does not seem to be a place where one can decline to say 
more when pressed for an answer. On the contrary, these concepts seem to require just 
such learned treatments as the ones McDowell himself often quotes favourably; 
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Gadamer’s remarkable (as he says) discussion of the human mode of life, and Aristotle’s 
classic discussion of ethics and practical wisdom – approaches that do not shy away from 
the messy nature of human interaction, be it in language, thought, or action. But rather 
than following in their steps, McDowell limits himself to a selective rehearsal of some of 
the points he finds useful in bringing forth a stripped-down notion of second nature – at 
the same time as he claims that the reason Kant could not see things clearly was because 
he lacked a “seriously exploitable”122, or “pregnant notion of second nature [which] 
explains why the right conception of experience cannot find a firm position in his 
thinking.”123 However, even if the charge he raises against Kant is that he does not even 
conceive of the idea of a second nature, the point seems to bear noticing: in the absence 
of a more detailed discussion of these notions, how ‘seriously exploitable’ is McDowell’s 
own notion of second nature? 
This seems to bring the discussion in line with a criticism that was raised earlier, for 
whereas McDowell’s central concepts seems mired in issues that has been the topic of 
constructive philosophy since the dawn of philosophy, Wittgenstein’s focus on 
“particularistic and self-consciously non-theoretical investigation of “language-
games”124, as Friedman puts it, seems more suited to a quietist approach. Perhaps is 
McDowell’s engagement with the tradition, and the richness of the concepts he invokes, 
impeding the adoption of a quietist attitude, as Friedman suggests? In what sense can 
questions on how we enter a language – “which serves as a repository of tradition, a store 
of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what”125 – and, as 
McDowell ends by saying, “is the same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think 
and act intentionally”126, be left to quietude? At times, McDowell comes close to 
conceding the obligation for further clarification that such rich concepts seem to carry. In 
the penultimate section we find him raising the selfsame question that bothered us to 
begin with. As he says, “How has it come about that there are animals that possess 
spontaneity of understanding? This is a perfectly good question.”127 The “good questions 
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we can raise in the evolutionary context”, comes, as he says, “as close as good questions 
can to the philosophical questions I want to exorcize.”128 But again, the rejection that this 
commits him to an elaboration of his idea of second nature comes swift. We must, as he 
says, be clear what we are doing, 
 
“It would be one thing to give an evolutionary account of the fact that the normal human maturation 
includes the acquisition of second nature, which involves the responsiveness to meaning; it would be quite 
another thing to give a constitutive account of what responsiveness to meaning is. I have been granting that 
it is reasonable to look for an evolutionary story. That is not a concession to the sort of constructive 
philosophical account of meaning … whose point would be to make the relevant sort of intelligibility safe 
for a naturalism without second nature. That is a misbegotten idea, and there is no comfort for it here.”129 
 
So are we then nevertheless not entitled a more detailed account of second nature? Is 
Friedman wrong in thinking that McDowell’s engagement with the philosophical 
tradition is incompatible with quietism? On the basis of a point that was made in the 
introduction to this thesis, holding McDowell accountable for a more detailed story about 
second nature seems clearly to be a misreading of what he says – a misreading that comes 
about by an insensitivity to what McDowell is up to. As we saw in the introduction, at 
one level of abstraction the question that governs McDowell’s inquiry is not 
epistemological, but directed at how we can be in touch with the world at all, thereby 
predating the epistemological question of how we can come to know about the world. 
Seen thus, what McDowell intends to make possible with his introduction of second 
nature (i.e. not an explanation of our epistemological standing in the world, but our 
rational, or world-directed standing tout court) makes us able to appreciate what he says 
on Wittgenstein, on how he thinks he can be entitled to quietism. 
McDowell explicitly aligns his work with Wittgenstein’s later writings by saying that 
“I think naturalized platonism is a good way to understand what Wittgenstein is driving at 
there.”130 In contrasts to a common reading of Wittgenstein’s later writings, which holds 
that the spookiness of reasons conceived as facts independent of human communities (i.e. 
a rampant platonism) is countered by Wittgenstein by a communitarian or “social 
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pragmatist” model of meaning131, McDowell charges that this makes unintelligible his 
endorsement of quietism. And quietism, he says,  
 
“is not just a quirk of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, to be set aside while we proceed to read him as just 
another ordinary philosopher. The aspiration is not fantastic. The naturalism of second nature that I have 
been describing is precisely a shape of our thinking that would leave even the last dualism not seeming to 
call for constructive philosophy.”132 
 
Rather than querying how we can come to know, or what our knowledgeable 
standing consists in, which would lead us into a complex discussion of all the aspects 
comprising the human epistemological standing, the question is simpler, leaner, only 
requiring that we see how there can be room for reason or intentionality in nature, how 
such a possibility can be conceived. It seems therefore that the demand for further 
elaboration of second nature is a misconception based on conflating McDowell’s 
question on how we can be directed towards the world with epistemology proper. 
It is to a certain extent difficult to insist on further clarification from someone when 
the whole idea is that one is simply supposed to see the correct answer once all other 
seemingly plausible answers are wiped away. That no more is necessary than a gesture in 
the right direction, once the wholly negative undertaking of making everyone else come 
out with implausible views has been satisfyingly brought home. It is of course an open 
question whether that has been done, but at least McDowell thinks he can shovel Wright 
onto the scrap-pile of Mythists, while others of his critics assumes this position of their 
own free will, arguing that it is not a Myth. In the end, one cannot force McDowell to 
clarify views he thinks any attempts at explanation simply distorts, although, at times, he 
certainly appears to be a rather talkative quietist with a “theory” that has caused a great 
stir. 
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Essay II. What is the Debate on Nonconceptual Content About? 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past twenty-five years or so, philosophy of language and mind has witnessed a 
heated debate over whether or not perception has a nonconceptual content. The 
characterization, as paraphrased here, is taken from Christopher Peacocke133 – himself 
one of the main contenders in the debate – and the issue, though with time a multifaceted 
and broad theme in it self, is often characterized as addressing the question whether or 
not there can be “mental states that can represent the world even though the bearers of 
those mental states does not possess the concepts required to specify their content.”134 
Opposing the ‘nonconceptualists,’ whose numbers count Michael Ayers, José Bermúdez, 
Tim Crane, Christopher Peacocke and Michael Tye, among a few, stand, most notably 
Bill Brewer, John McDowell, Alva Nöe, and Sonia Sedivy, who, in one way or the other, 
and in opposition to the nonconceptualists, can be said to hold the “widely held view that 
the way in which a creature can represent the world is determined by its conceptual 
capacities.”135 
The issue is decisive, as much else seems to follow from what stance one adopts 
towards it, and John McDowell strives ardently in his well-known book Mind and World 
to establish that, contrary to what the nonconceptualists claim, human sensory 
experiences already come imbued with conceptual content, and that they “have their 
content by virtue of the fact that conceptual capacities are operative in them.”136 If there 
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is at all a nonconceptual-component in our perceptual experiences, the idea seems to be, 
it is not necessary in order to explain the content of those sensory experiences.137 
Although these brief truncated remarks may suffice to give a minimal, or first 
approximation of where the conceptualist and nonconceptualists disagree – drawing up 
the fault line so to speak, which separates the conceptualists and nonconceptualists – they 
provide little, however, on what the idea of a nonconceptual content is. In spite of its 
centrality, the question of what is meant by a nonconceptual content remains highly 
disputed and has resulted in a recent flurry of articles which seeks to address the issue. 
Robert Stalnaker is in just this errand in his paper “What Might Nonconceptual Content 
Be?”, where he, in the opening lines of the essay asks with an air of exasperation: “what 
do these philosophers mean by “nonconceptual content”, and its contrast “conceptual 
content”?”138. Alex Byrne joins in, almost verbatim, by questioning what a conceptual 
content is, “and how is it different from nonconceptual content?”139, while the felt 
obligation to first define what he’s about to discuss similarly compels Richard Heck to 
“say a few words about how [he] understand[s] the claim that perceptual content is 
nonconceptual”140. And the list goes on: almost everyone entering the debate seems to 
feel implored to say something about what they take nonconceptual content to be before 
delivering their views on whether or not there can be such a content. If they don’t 
necessarily agree on the substance of the matter, they do agree that greater clarity is 
needed – although the increase in interest does not seem to have provided the 
illuminating light needed. On the contrary, as Bermúdez says in one of the latest articles 
to appear, “the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly 
ramified. … Even worse, significant parts of the discussion are somewhat confused.”141 
Common to many of these attempts at clarifying the debate is that they approach the 
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question by labouring a conceptual distinction within the nonconceptual position, arguing 
that one can understand the claim that there is a nonconceptual content in two 
fundamentally different ways. On one understanding of the issue – ‘content 
nonconceptualism’ – the claim is that there can be two different kinds of content in 
experience: a conceptual and a nonconceptual. Jeff Speaks, following Richard Heck’s 
original terminology142, argues that, “The first sense of the claim says something about 
the sort of contents perceptions have: it claims that those contents have a certain monadic 
property, the property of being nonconceptual.”143 The problem is, as he rightly points 
out, to determine what this property is: what the difference in kind between that content 
which can be characterised as nonconceptual and that which is said to be conceptual 
amounts to. Although Speaks speculates that it might be that “the constituents of the 
contents of beliefs [or more generally, propositional attitudes] are concepts or Fregean 
senses, whereas the constituents of the contents of perceptions are objects and 
properties,”144 he does not go any further, arguing that we can ‘bypass’ the enquiry into 
precisely what this difference in content resides in by simply “defining the thesis of the 
proponent of this kind of nonconceptual content in terms of a difference in kind between 
the contents of perceptions and the contents of “conceptual” states like beliefs and 
thoughts.”145 In brief, ‘content nonconceptualism’, or in Speaks terminology, the idea that 
there may be an ‘absolute nonconceptual content’, can be summarised as the idea that: 
 
 “A mental state has absolutely nonconceptual content if and only if that mental state has a 
different kind of content than do beliefs, thoughts, and so on.”146 
 
However, it has more recently been argued that there may in addition be a second 
way to characterise the debate, which does not attribute that which is claimed to be 
nonconceptual to the content of experience, but instead places the locus of the discussion 
– what it is that, arguably at least, may be nonconceptual – on the possibility (or 
impossibility) of nonconceptual mental states. According to proponents of ‘state 
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nonconceptualism’, “there is no reason [to think] that perceptions cannot have the same 
sort of things as their contents [as beliefs and other propositional attitudes]; it is just that 
the contents of a thinker’s perceptual states can, while the content of her beliefs cannot, 
involve concepts she does not possess.”147 
The ‘state view’ thereby leaves room for the idea that there may be two different 
kinds of mental states, which Heck calls ‘concept-dependent’ and ‘concept-independent’, 
with the same content. This means – or so I take it at least – that being in a certain mental 
state, e.g. that of perceiving the famous and well-worn cat on the mat is to be in a state 
with the same content as, say, believing the cat to be on the mat. The difference between 
the two states is that the second is a propositional attitude while the first is not, and while 
having a propositional attitude demands that the possessor of the state be in possession of 
the concepts necessary to specify the content of that attitude in order to be in that mental 
state148, the same content – according to the proponents of the state view – can feature in 
a state of (merely) perceiving without thereby demanding of the perceiver that she 
possesses the concepts necessary to specify the content of her perception. Perceiving, it 
seems, is, according to ‘state nonconceptualism’, a nonconceptual state par excellence, 
and – to rub it in – it differs from ‘content nonconceptualism’, not in that it takes 
experience to have a different content than belief but in maintaining that a perceiver and a 
believer can be variously related to the same content through concept-independent and 
concept-dependent states respectively. 
However, and as the preceding discussion seems to imply, there has been a certain 
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amount of infighting between the advocates of nonconceptualism over which of the two 
views should be seen as primary. In his paper on nonconceptualism, where Heck 
introduces the distinction between a ‘state’ view and a ‘content’ view to the debate, he 
goes so far as to say that he “suspects the state view [to be] indefensible – even 
incoherent if coupled with the claim that the contents of belief are conceptual”149. 
Bermúdez seems similarly unimpressed by the ‘state’ view in his original entry on 
nonconceptual content for the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, where he curtly 
mentions the ‘state’ view towards the end of his introduction before proclaiming that 
“although it has been suggested (Byrne forthcoming) that the "state" view of 
nonconceptual content should be taken as primary, I will principally be discussing the 
"content" view in this article.”150 In the revised edition of the entry, co-edited with Aron 
Cahen, they spend a lot more space on the ‘state’ view, having inserted a long section 
entitled “An important distinction: State vs. content nonconceptualism”, but in the end 
Bermúdez and Cahen remains equally unconvinced by the prospects of the ‘state’ view, 
lashing out against the founding distinction in ‘state’ nonconceptualism between concept-
dependent and concept-independent states, by arguing that: 
 
“The difficulty … with the “state” view is that it is unclear what basis there might be for a distinction 
between concept-dependent and concept-independent state types other than the distinctive contents of these 
states. That is, the “state” view owes us some account of why some states, such as the propositional 
attitudes, are concept-dependent, whereas other states, such as perceptual states, are concept-
independent.”151 
 
York H. Gunther, in his introduction to a collection of texts on nonconceptual 
content joins the sceptical ranks, by arguing that; 
 
“Occasionally, participants in this debate speak about the conceptuality or nonconceptuality of 
intentional states rather than contents, using locutions like “conceptual state” or “nonconceptual 
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representation.” As I hope is clear, the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists concerns the 
kind of content such states bear, not, strictly speaking, the kinds of states (representations, attitudes, etc.) 
that they are.”152 
 
These sceptical remarks stands in sharp contrast to those who, like Stalnaker, argue 
explicitly for perceiving the ‘state’ view as primary – with Stalnaker ending his essay by 
claiming that, in fact, all content should be viewed as nonconceptual in this sense.153 
Speaks, on his side, is similarly baffled by what he sees as Heck’s undefended claim that 
the state view might be indefensible or incoherent,154 and in spite of some misgivings, the 
distinction between a ‘content’ version and a ‘state’ version of nonconceptualism seems 
to have established itself in today’s discussion on nonconceptual content. 
However, the concern with – as we may perhaps put it – how best to formally155 
characterise the claim that there can be such a thing as a nonconceptual content has 
obscured a more fundamental question, namely; what the debate on nonconceptual 
content is about. The distinction between these two questions surfaces, although no more 
than superficially, in Bermúdez and Cahen’s encyclopaedia entry, where they open the 
entry by noting that the, 
 
“basic idea has been developed in different ways and applied to different categories of mental states. 
Not all of these developments and applications are consistent with each other, but each offers a challenge to 
the widely held view that the way a creature can represent the world is determined by its conceptual 
capacities.”156 
 
Although they note that the idea of a nonconceptual content has been developed in 
ways which might not be consistent with each other, and go on to organize their 
discussion of nonconceptualism in subsections according to the categories, or areas, at 
which the notion of a nonconceptual content has been pressed; in adult perception, in 
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representational states at the subpersonal level, and in representational states of non-
human animals and human infants, any discussion of what groups these very different 
developments under one common heading – what makes them all a case of pressing the 
idea of a ‘nonconceptual content’ – is lacking. However, without a clear sense that they 
are all pressing the same idea, there is nothing that guarantees that discussions on the 
nonconceptual content of subpersonal states can be juxtaposed with discussions on 
nonconceptual content in perception. Most likely, it seems, the various developments of 
the idea of a nonconceptual content are not pressing a unified idea, which makes it even 
more important to specify what one takes the debate to be about, before launching an 
attack, or defence, of nonconceptualism. 
Robert Stalnaker seems to air a similar complaint when he, in the extension of the 
exclamation above, concedes that; “it is not clear to me that the different philosophers 
using this term [i.e. nonconceptual content] mean the same thing by it.”157 He claims to 
be puzzled by what the different philosophers partaking in the debate say, and confesses 
to having: 
 
“the impression that their arguments are being guided, on both sides, by conceptions of content and its 
role in the explanation of perception and thought that have underlying presuppositions that I don’t share, 
and don’t fully understand.”158 
 
However, rather than to “ferret out those presuppositions by detailed examination of 
the texts”159 he says that he intends to spell out his own assumptions and ask how, based 
on these assumptions, “a distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual might be 
drawn”160. While this is perhaps a tempting or even natural approach for anyone faced 
with a debate whose assumptions seem inherently shrouded in the dark, it is nevertheless 
unfortunate. For as long as these underlying assumptions on what one takes the debate to 
be about – what one takes the import of nonconceptual content to be – remains hidden 
and segregated from the question on what nonconceptual content is, it is not at all clear 
that the latter question makes any sense. Stalnaker’s contribution might be honest, in that 
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he at least spells out in more detail than most what he takes nonconceptual content to be. 
But if we are interested in the question of whether or not there can be a nonconceptual 
content, it seems that we are, pace Stalnaker, obliged to ‘ferret’ out some of the 
underlying assumptions that populate the debate – to ask what is meant by a 
nonconceptual content – in order to be able to ask the further question: given that this is 
what the debate is about, can there be such a thing as a nonconceptual content? 
While this may seem trivially true, I believe there has been far too little perceptivity 
in the debate on nonconceptual content to the importance of pinning down the scope of 
the debate.161 A few straws in the wind should nevertheless be mentioned, as the 
difficulty seems, with time, to have begun to make its presence known in the debate. T. 
M. Crowther in particular, seems to suggest an interesting and fruitful way of carving up 
the messy landscape. In his “Two conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism” 
he says that:  
 
“My aim here is not to offer new arguments for or against non-conceptualism, but to work towards a 
better understanding of precisely what is at issue between nonconceptualists and their conceptualist 
opponents. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical 
approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. I aim to show that this 
assumption is mistaken.”162 
 
In doing so Crowther makes a distinction, which may at first look like a reiteration of 
the ‘state-content’ distinction, but which in fact provides a more helpful way of placing 
some of the suggestions that populate the debate. In the lead-up to the distinction, 
however, Crowther makes two claims about the debate, which helps to clarify the 
common ground in between conceptualists and nonconceptualists; firstly, that, “The 
neutral notion of content at issue in the debate between conceptualists and 
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nonconceptualists is of the truth-evaluable content of perceptual experience.”163 And 
secondly, that “The debate about the truth-evaluable content of perceptual experience 
takes place against a broad background of agreement that accounting for the cognitive 
significance of beliefs, thoughts and judgements requires understanding their contents 
along Fregean lines; as consisting of concepts.”164 One way of addressing the debate 
therefore, would be to query whether or not this requirement also applies to the truth-
evaluable content of perceptual experiences. Or as Crowther says,  
 
“Suppose a set of circumstances in which a subject is undergoing a perceptual experience with a 
content, p. One question one might ask of such a set of circumstances is, ‘Is p composed of concepts?’ 
where p is composed of concepts if and only if p is built up exclusively from Fregean senses.”165 
 
And as Crowther adds, “That there is a constituent of p which is not a Fregean sense 
will be sufficient for p to lack exclusively conceptual structure.”166 To pose the question 
this way would be to understand the debate on nonconceptual content to be a debate on 
the compositionality of the content of perceptual experiences.167 And according to 
Crowther, this is the conception of the debate which is at stake between McDowell and 
Christopher Peacocke. 
A second way of addressing the debate “concerns the relation between a subject’s 
undergoing the kind of episode that he does when he has an experience with the content 
p, and his possession of certain conceptual skills.”168 Crowther defines this as the 
possessional question about nonconceptual content, and says that, 
 
“What this second question brings into focus is not the nature of the constituents of the truth-evaluable 
content. Rather, what’s at issue here is what it is for a subject to be related towards that truth-evaluable 
content in perceptual experience, and whether a condition of that relation is a grasp of certain ways of 
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thinking.”169 
 
On the face of it, this way of dissecting the landscape resembles the ‘state-content’ 
dichotomy, but Crowther’s distinction allows a certain amount of room and flexibility 
that does not come out on the two-dimensional ‘state-content’ dichotomy, in which the 
debate is construed as either about whether or not one needs to possess concepts to 
entertain an experience, or, whether or not the content of that experience is conceptually 
structured. In Crowther’s schema, on the other hand, there is room for positions that 
combine conceptualism on the one area with nonconceptualism on the other. At the 
extremities of the schema, we have conceptualism about composition combined with 
conceptualism about possession – pure conceptualism, which Crowther labels P1 – and 
pure nonconceptualism; nonconceptualism about both composition and possession, 
Crowther’s alternative P2. But we can also conceive of intermediate positions: on a third 
alternative, P3, which Crowther likens to that of Evans, the belief in a nonconceptual 
content, conceived compositionally, is combined with the demand that to entertain an 
experience with a content p we need to possess those concepts.170 And on the fourth 
combination, P4, the belief in a compositionally conceptual content is combined with 
nonconceptualism with respect to possession. On such a view, “the content of the 
experience is conceptually composed, though it is not necessary for the subject to be 
undergoing an experience with such a content that they possess the concepts that 
characterize it.”171 
It is interesting, as Crowther says, that, “Given the amount of discussion that the 
notion of nonconceptual content has generated … these differences in the way that the 
subject-matter of debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists is conceived have 
received little attention.”172 The lack of clarity on what the debate is about is of course an 
insensitivity that affects a proper understanding of any of the suggestions in play, but it is 
one that McDowell in particular seems to have had to suffer from, as he is, almost by 
default, attacked left and right for being the arch-defender of conceptualism. However, as 
long as no probing questions are asked as to what, precisely, McDowell takes himself to 
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defend, it seems that any critic is in danger of lashing out against a conceptualism that 
isn’t really McDowell’s. In the following I therefore propose to give a survey of a couple 
of the numerous suggestions that have been made in the debate, and to distinguish them 
from what I believe McDowell takes himself to be committed to. Although in no way 
meant to be exhaustive, I distinguish three different suggestions as to what the debate on 
nonconceptual content has been taken to be about: an approach centring on the 
possession-condition identified above; a ‘cognitivist’ approach; and what we may call an 
‘empiricist’ approach to nonconceptual content. 
The first of these is Tim Crane’s suggestion, as it comes out in two short papers from 
1988. In the “Waterfall Illusion”, and in a reply to criticism by D. H. Mellor, the central 
argument for the existence of a nonconceptual content in perception is that perceptual 
content is not revisable, in the way in which beliefs is. Later, in a paper from 1992, this is 
refined into the claim that perceptual content is not inferentially related. But Crane’s 
conception of what the debate is about seems at odds with that of McDowell: whereas 
Crane focuses on the non-inferentiality of mental states – and whether or not an 
experiencing subject needs to possess the relevant concepts in order to be in that state – 
McDowell sees the debate as being about the content of perceptual experience. 
The second approach, which is José Bermúdez’s suggestion, seems to approach the 
debate from an angle that McDowell explicitly defines as outside the scope of the 
discussion as he sees it: that there can be content at the subpersonal level. In doing so, 
Bermúdez commits the mistake, as McDowell sees it, of blurring the distinction between 
what is a respectable notion in cognitive psychology, and what takes place at the level of 
self-conscious thinking (see note 5 above). Although it is an increasingly popular 
conception of what the discussion is a discussion about, it seems to be fundamentally at 
odds with what McDowell takes to be at centre stage in the debate. 
The third conception of what the debate is about, is developed by Michael Ayers, 
and criticised by Hannah Ginsborg. Ayers’s approach is one of the few contributions to 
explicitly set out what he takes the debate to be about. However, nor does Ayers’s claim 
that the discussion is a version of the old debate between empiricism and rationalism over 
whether experience comes prior to the formation of concepts, or vice versa, seem to 
capture what McDowell takes himself to be arguing. On the other hand, Hannah 
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Ginsborg, seems to my mind to come closer to a characterisation of the debate as 
McDowell sees it than she actually realizes. 
I begin, however, by sketching the early beginnings of the discussion with its origin 
in Gareth Evans’s work. As will become clear, McDowell’s conception of what is at 
stake in the debate on nonconceptual content is the suggestion – central in Evans’s The 
Varieties of Reference – that our conceptual apparatus takes us from a nonconceptual 
content in perception, to a conceptualized belief. It is primarily this view McDowell 
attempts to address in Mind and World, and it is in opposition to Evans’s suggestion that 
we should understand McDowell’s claim that our experience is already conceptual. 
 
II. The early beginnings: Evans 
The notion of a nonconceptual content was first introduced by Gareth Evans, in his 
seminal work The Varieties of Reference from 1982.173 In discussing the relation between 
perception and judgement Evans appears to deny that the two have a common content, 
saying, in a much quoted passage, that:  
 
“The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or non-
conceptualized. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involves conceptualization … the process 
of conceptualization or judgement takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with 
a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state 
(with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content).”174 
 
One of Evans’s main concerns throughout his short philosophical career seems to 
have been with explaining how there can be object-directed thoughts, and at the heart of 
Evans’s philosophy was, according to Martin Davies, a dissatisfaction with both the 
description theory and the causal theory of reference.175 According to Davies, Evans 
claimed that the description theory was build on a “flawed account of what is involved in 
                                                 
173
 Precursors in the philosophy of perception and cognitive science, had, according to Bermúdez and 
Cahen (2008), appeared in the works of Fred Dretske and Stephen Stich, but Bermúdez and Cahen credit 
Evans for being the first to explicitly introduce the notion to analytic philosophy. 
174
 Evans 1982: 227 (emphasis in original). 
175
 As Davies says, “Although The Varieties of Reference begins and ends with philosophy of language 
(returning to the topic of names and name-using practices in its final chapter), the central chapters address 
the issue of thoughts directed toward particular objects.” (Davies 2006: 2) 
 48 
thought directed toward a particular object”176, and the fact that a name may change its 
reference over time made him similarly argue that “a bare causal connection is not 
sufficient to underwrite reference.”177 The deficiency Evans found in the philosophy of 
language also found its counterpart in the philosophy of mind: “here as in philosophy of 
language, [Evans was concerned] that causal theories were liable to be insufficiently 
demanding”178, unable to secure a relation between thought and object. 
Inspired by Russell’s Principle that I can have an object-directed thought only when I 
am acquainted with the object of my thought – and as Russell said, “I am acquainted with 
an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly 
aware of the object itself”179 – Evans developed an account of object-directed thought, 
although with a less stringent version of Russell’s Principle, in which “presently 
perceiving the object, being able to recognise it, knowing discriminating facts about it”180 
sufficed to meet its requirement. In relaxing the requirement, Evans “maintained that a 
subject may think about a particular object in virtue of standing in a contextual relation to 
it and without being able to frame any description that the object uniquely satisfies.”181 
Whereas under Russell’s construal, a thinker would be related to an object only by 
meeting the principle of acquaintance, on Evans’s account, as Davies puts is, “a thinker’s 
Idea of an object depends on an information-link between the thinker and the object”182. 
Important for our concern, however, is that Evans saw these ‘information links’ as 
primitive, not explicable in terms of belief or other conceptual states183, and so an 
information link would act as a bridge, taking a conceptually endowed perceiver184 from 
an informational state with a nonconceptual content to another kind of cognitive state 
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with a conceptual content, as we saw above. But in giving an explanation of the relation 
between a perceptual state, and a conceptual state, such as a belief or judgement, Evans 
believed he had an explanation of how we can have object directed thoughts.185 
However, while Evans’s ideas have acted as a starting point and inspiration for later 
discussions on nonconceptual content, his own stand on the issue – how he understood 
the notion – was, according to most interpreters, not very clear. In particular, and in line 
with the dominant concern of the debate, whether he meant to press the ‘state’ view or 
the ‘content’ view, as described above, seems difficult to untangle. Jeff Speaks, after 
admitting that Evans is not clear on the issue, nevertheless goes on to argue that the 
above-quoted passage from The Varieties of Reference indicates that Evans at least 
supported a version of nonconceptualism, which emphasises that perception has a 
different kind of content to conceptual states such as belief states.186 Richard Heck on the 
other hand, develops elements of Evans’s view as suggesting a ‘state’ nonconceptualism, 
although he adds that “the text is simply too thin to support the attribution to him of any 
specific, developed view that perceptual content is nonconceptual.”187 Others again, like 
Bermúdez and Cahen, are even more sceptical of Evans’s nonconceptualist aspirings: 
 
“Evans is not always clear whether he understands nonconceptual content to be a personal level or a 
subpersonal level phenomenon. And, in fact, it seems that Evans's conception of nonconceptual content is 
in at least one important way deeply antithetical to that currently discussed. Whereas much contemporary 
discussion of nonconceptual content is focused on the content of conscious perceptual states, it looks very 
much as if Evans understands perceptual states with nonconceptual content as being non-conscious until 
the subject's conceptual abilities are brought to bear on them.”188 
 
Evans’s characterization of nonconceptual content as a pre-conceptualised input to a 
concept-applying mechanism makes the claim that Evans conceives of nonconceptual 
content as non-conscious content at least not wholly implausible. But one may wonder 
why Bermúdez and Cahen judge from this that Evans’s understanding of the 
nonconceptual is antithetical to the issue as it is discussed today? As we saw above, 
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Bermúdez and Cahen themselves include among those areas where the idea of a 
nonconceptual content has been pressed, two, broadly defined, areas which seem – at 
least intuitively – to focus on non-conscious aspects of our mental lives. In addition to 
pressing the claim that there is a nonconceptual content in perception, philosophers have, 
they tell us, argued for a nonconceptual content, firstly, in explaining the ‘content of 
subpersonal representational states’, and secondly, in “explaining the behaviour of certain 
non-human animals and of pre-conceptual human infants.”189 
In debating the first of these, tacit knowledge of the rules of syntax as well as 
representational states postulated in computational theories of vision have been taken as 
examples of representational content where the speaker or the perceiver need not possess 
the concepts which would be used to describe the content of those states under a 
canonical description.190 Although ‘tacit knowledge’ is a contentious philosophical 
notion, there is at least one way in which it can be understood as a kind of knowledge that 
is non-consciously possessed, and on this prevalent view, first propagated by Chomsky, 
that is how we should think of our use of grammatical rules in speaking, or of the 
workings of our visual system in perceiving.191 Or, in exploring the second of the above-
mentioned areas: by holding a very relaxed notion of concept-possession one could argue 
that “possessing a given concept simply requires being able to make justified judgments 
involving that concept rather than being able to justify judgments involving that 
concept”192 – as one could claim, for instance, that being able to discriminate red from 
green objects qualifies as possessing the concepts ‘red’ and ‘green’. This way one could 
maintain a conceptualism in explaining the behaviour of non-human animals and pre-
conceptual human infants, but the grip on the concepts involved may be so weak – even 
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in adult humans, as McDowell’s chicken sexers example illustrates193 – as to border on 
the subconscious.194 But if both of these broadly defined areas intuitively seem to be 
about, or at the very minimum, deal with aspects of our mental lives which border onto 
the non-conscious, one might wonder why Bermúdez and Cahen thinks Evans’s 
conception of a nonconceptual content is antithetical to the way today’s discussion of the 
issue is conducted. Why couldn’t Evans’s view, with its apparent focus on the non-
conscious, fit neatly into one of these categories?  
However, the reason for evoking the idea of a nonconceptual content in subpersonal 
representational states and in the explanation of non-human and pre-conceptual human 
behaviour, is not “that language-users are not aware of the beliefs in question”195 – i.e., 
that the belief that they are applying the correct grammatical rules, or that the visual 
system works the way it does, are non-conscious beliefs, and therefore nonconceptual. It 
is not that which makes them nonconceptual. As Bermúdez and Cahen goes on to argue: 
there might be other non-conscious but nevertheless concept-dependent beliefs, which 
proves that the issue of a conceptual versus a nonconceptual content is not that of a 
conscious versus a non-conscious content.196 The reason for pressing a nonconceptual 
content in these areas is rather that in the case of the speakers’ tacit knowledge of 
linguistic rules, their “representations of the linguistic rules are inferentially insulated 
from the rest of their beliefs and propositional attitudes, in a way that is fundamentally 
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incompatible with the holistic nature of conceptual contents.”197 The same can be claimed 
about the content of representational states postulated in computational theories of vision, 
and ultimately, it seems, about perceptual content itself. The content of all these states, it 
is argued, is nonconceptual because it is inferentially insulated from the content of other 
computational or perceptual states. 
 
III. Crane: the argument from non-inferentiality 
An early development of this interesting line of reasoning was introduced to the debate 
by Tim Crane, in a brief exchange with D. H. Mellor in 1988 over the “Waterfall 
Illusion”.198 In the illusion, a stationary object both seems and seems not to be moving in 
the opposite direction of an immediately preceding observed movement – as may happen 
if one stares at a waterfall for a period of time, for then to move one’s gaze onto a stone 
on the riverbank (which then both seems and seems not to move upwards). In contrast to 
the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion, which “presents a conflict between two intentional 
states: the state of believing that the lines are the same length, and the state of the lines 
looking to be different lengths”199, the Waterfall Illusion seems to present us with a 
“contradiction in the one content of one attitude.”200 It is “the content of the experience 
itself [which] is contradictory”201. This poses, according to Crane, a problem for the claim 
that the content of perceptual experience is composed of concepts. For although the 
illusion rightfully seems to present us with a case where we have an experience with a 
concept (‘moving’) and its negation at the same time, this simply cannot be the case as it 
would lead to a contradiction in our conceptual schema, which, to echo Bermúdez, is 
fundamentally at odds with the holistic nature of all conceptual content. But as we are 
faced with a contradictory content (according to Crane), the illusion seems to present a 
“counterexample to the thesis that concepts are involved in the content of perceptual 
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experience.”202 Only by understanding the content of perception as nonconceptual can we 
avoid the incoherent conclusion that the content of the illusion is constituted by a 
contradictory pair of concepts. 
Crane’s paper immediately spurred a response by Mellor, who disagreed with the 
lessons Crane drew from the illusion. Mellor argued that we are faced with two, and not 
one experience in the illusion, and that this creates two rivalling belief-dispositions where 
the one winning forth determines what we end up believing.203 This eludes the problem 
of the one contradictory content, but does so by evoking a dispositional theory of belief; a 
theory that has its own difficulties, among others how to explain the Müller-Lyer 
Illusion.204 It is in responding to Mellor’s dispositional analysis of perception that Crane 
first makes use of what can be said to be the argument from non-inferentiality in its most 
rudimentary form. While conceding a few points to Mellor, he politely disagrees with 
Mellor’s suggestion that a dispositional analysis can fully explain the illusion, or, as he 
puts it:  
 
“How can the notion of an inclination to believe capture what is distinctive about the content of 
perception? In particular, how can it explain the general fact (of which the Waterfall Illusion is an 
illustration) that, unlike beliefs, the contents of one’s perceptual states cannot be revised in response to 
further evidence? If perceptions were simply inclinations to believe, one would expect that the inclination 
which ‘loses’ (in our case, that a is moving) would no longer be present to the mind.”205 
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The non-revisability of perceptual content is presented as what makes it unwarranted 
to equate perception with dispositions to believe, and is that which, in 1988, seems to 
support Crane’s argument that perceptual content is nonconceptual. However, a few years 
later the argument reappears in a more developed form – at which time the conclusion 
from 1988 is modified and we are told that, “Although perceptions are unrevisable, the 
conclusion that they have nonconceptual contents will not follow from this fact alone.”206 
For there are other inferential relations, which as yet, we do not know if applies to 
perception or not. 
The three inferential relations Crane identifies – all of which define beliefs, but 
which, according to Crane, do not apply to perception – are: firstly, the deductive 
inference from believing that a is F, and that a is G, to the belief that a is F and G. 
Secondly, the semantic relation inherent in belief, between “the belief that p … and 
certain other beliefs that you ought to have if that belief is to have the content p.”207 And 
thirdly: the revisability of a belief in the light of other beliefs. Since, as Crane argues, it 
seems that; (1) there is no inference from perceiving that a is F, and a (later) perception 
that a is G, to the perception that a is F and G; (2) there are no further perceptions one 
ought to have on the basis of any perception; and (3) perceptions are not revisable in light 
of other perceptions, none of these inferential relations seems to hold for perception, and 
the conclusion that perception has a different kind of content follows. 
The fact that Crane here seems to address the nature of perceptual states appears to 
indicate that he conceives the debate in terms of whether or not, in having an experience, 
we need to possess the concepts that characterise that experience – i.e. the possessional 
view characterised above – and in later works he explicitly couches characterizations of 
the debate on nonconceptual content in those terms.208 This makes Crane’s view seem 
explainable within the ‘state-content’ distinction discussed above, and Crane is often 
mentioned as one of the first to have defended an approach that takes the central issue to 
be whether or not there can be mental states that are nonconceptual. However, there is a 
danger that dissecting the issue this way is too coarse – that it threatens to obscure that 
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Crane’s conception of the debate seems not really to be engaging with McDowell’s 
conceptualism at all.209 If we apply Crowther’s schema, however, the different 
conceptions on what the debate is about – how the suggestions seems to talk past each 
other by taking different stands on what the debate is about – come out clearer. 
In seeing how Crane’s suggestion bypasses the discussion as McDowell sees it, we 
are taken back to Evans. McDowell appears to take Evans as arguing for something like 
P3, which, as we saw above, is the combination of compositional nonconceptualism and 
possessional conceptualism. In setting out Evans’s view for criticism he cites the passage 
with which we introduced Evans above, before reiterating the message in his own words 
as the claim that; 
 
“Evans, then, identifies perceptual experiences as states of the informational system, possessing 
content that is non-conceptual. According to Evans, conceptual capacities are first brought into operation 
only when one makes a judgement of experience, and at that point a different species of content comes into 
play.”210 
   
However, in setting out Evans’s position, McDowell seems at the same time to 
define what he takes the question to concern. It is Evans’s claim that seems to be what 
McDowell takes the debate on nonconceptual content to be about: the claim that there is a 
different kind of content in perception than that found in beliefs and judgement – a 
suggestion, which he in Mind and World staunchly opposes. However, in taking that 
view, the possessional claim – that we need to possess the concepts p to entertain an 
experience with the content p – seems irrelevant to the debate on nonconceptual content; 
it simply does not seem to be part of what McDowell takes the debate to be about. As he 
says, 
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“Both Evans and I are committed to there being different stories to tell about perceptual goings-on in 
creatures with spontaneity and in creatures without it. In the one case we can apply the notion of 
experience, in a strict sense that connects it with conceptual capacities, and in the other case we cannot.”211 
 
In essence, McDowell’s discussion is limited to the perceptual experiences of 
mature, adult concept-possessors, and he appears rather uninterested in the cognitive lives 
of animals and young children, as they do not entertain experiences as such. It is a 
premise in McDowell’s discussion that we stick to concept-possessors, as we are 
interested – not in whether someone needs to possess concepts to experience: that is 
baked into the definition of what it is to entertain an experience – but how to characterize 
the perceptual content concept-possessors entertain; whether or not it differs from the 
conceptual content of their beliefs.212 In Crowther’s schema, this makes McDowell a 
theorist who simply assumes what Crane takes to be the point of contention, as he focuses 
exclusively on the content of experience, finding the question of possession not to be at 
issue. It is only in construing the debate on a nonconceptual content as being about 
concept-possession that it would require us to take seriously the cognitive lives of 
animals and human infants – but as we are discussing the perceptual content of 
experiences of concept-possessors, we do not really need to worry about animal 
cognition. Or as McDowell says, 
 
“We do not need to say that we have what mere animals have, non-conceptual content, and we have 
something else as well, since we can conceptualize that content and they cannot. Instead we say that we 
have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity to features of the environment, but we have it in 
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special form. Our perceptual sensitivity to our environment is taken up into the ambit of the faculty of 
spontaneity, which is what distinguishes us from them.”213 
 
In the end, it seems that what McDowell takes the claim he is making to boil down 
to, and what he takes to be at the centre of his disagreement with Evans, is whether we 
apply concepts in experience, or, as Evans claims, on a nonconceptual given. As he says, 
in a passage that I think sums up what McDowell takes the debate on nonconceptual 
content to be about: 
 
“when we enjoy experience conceptual content are drawn on in receptivity, not on some supposedly 
prior deliverances of receptivity.”214 
 
That this is a different question than what Crane takes to be at stake in the debate 
becomes patent when Crane, in discussing ‘Intentionalism’ – a view that addresses the 
conscious character of mental states, and whether or not they are reducible to the 
representational content of those states, or its entire intentional nature (by which Crane 
means mode and content215) – says that, the question on nonconceptual content “is not a 
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debate which needs to be settled in this context.”216 For McDowell, taking the debate on 
nonconceptual content to be about content rather than possession, it seems that that would 
be the place to discuss conceptualism versus nonconceptualism. 
However, if Crane’s suggestion targets a different issue in the philosophy of mind 
than what McDowell is discussing, what about the claim that there might be a 
nonconceptual content at the subpersonal level? How does that claim fare with 
McDowell’s conception of the debate as addressing the content of experience? On the 
face of it, it seems they are both questions directed at the content of experience, and that 
should make it possible to juxtapose them in a discussion over the nature of that content. 
In fact, Crane’s early contribution to the debate in 1988 appears ambiguous between 
featuring as an argument for the non-inferentiality of subpersonal computational states, 
or as an argument meant to explain the non-inferential nature of the content of 
perception. Whereas he in the first of the two papers here mentioned seems to speak 
exclusively about the Waterfall Illusion in a way that places the discussion at the level of 
perceptual experience, he appears, in his reply to Mellor, to introduce additional elements 
that makes the case less clear. In the reply he seems to embrace a description of the issue 
in terms of subpersonal states of the perceptual system, arguing that: 
 
“the picture of perception suggested by much recent work in the philosophy and psychology of 
perception (and to my mind, supported by the existence of the Waterfall Illusion) is that of the perceptual 
system as an information processor. … The contents of the states of the perceptual system are, of course, 
describable (by a theorist) in terms of certain concepts, but the system does not possess those concepts. It is 
not a thinker or an agent, and has no propositional attitudes”217 
 
Although he here presses the discussion in terms of the possession condition, 
proceeding to say that it is the possession of concepts that mark the difference between 
“someone who has genuine beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) and a mere 
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information processor”218, the way of drawing up the debate, with a distinction between 
states of the perceptual system and states of a perceiver, seems to open for the 
identification of a nonconceptual content at the subpersonal level of the perceptual 
system. 
The issue of a nonconceptual content at the subpersonal level is again broached in 
Crane’s introduction to a volume on perception from 1992. Commenting on the recent 
development in the philosophy of mind, Crane notes that “Since the 1970s this area of 
philosophy has undergone important changes, and the most significant of these is the 
increased interest in the notions of mental representation and content.”219 And, as he goes 
on to add, “This shift of interest … has, as one might expect, had its effects on the 
philosophy of perception. One obvious effect is the now generally accepted assumption 
that perceptions have content”220. According to Crane, this development, and with it, the 
renewed interest in determining the nature of perceptual content springs, among other, 
from “the growth of cognitive science … In particular, computational or information-
processing models of the mental have suggested ways to approach … traditional 
questions of the mind, [e.g.] how does the mind get ‘outside’ itself and represent external 
objects?”221 But although this has spurred a renewed interest in, and lead to the 
development of new approaches to the study of mind and its content, this can only be a 
beginning. For as Crane says, “although it is right to say, with the informational theory, 
that experiences have contents, this is not to say very much. The notion of content is a 
philosophical term of art – so without an account of perceptual content, the informational 
theory is a mere promise.”222 The following section addresses José Bermúdez’s attempts 
to give such an account, which directly couples the informational theory with the notion 
of a nonconceptual content, and what consequences this has for how the debate on 
nonconceptual content is perceived. 
 
IV. Cognitivist views on nonconceptual content 
According to Martin Davies, ‘the most striking difference’ between the early 
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introspectionist psychologies of the late 19th century and the cognitive psychology that 
developed in the 1950s and 60s, “is the latter’s appeal to unconscious mental states and 
processes.”223 After having started out as an experimental introspectionism, followed by 
decades of behaviourism, the “restauration of the mind as the proper subject matter of 
psychology came in the 1950s and amounted to a revolutionary end to the behaviourist 
era.”224 In the course of a decade, this new focus on the subconscious brought about some 
of the most lasting texts of cognitive science, such as Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax and Jerry Fodor’s Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Psychology. 
Among the early, influential works of cognitive science was also the publication of 
Daniel Dennett’s Content and Consciousness, in which Dennett draws up a distinction 
between a subpersonal and personal level of explanation. In Dennett’s seminal 
contribution, the distinction is drawn between descriptions of mental phenomena at a 
personal level, where we may speak of experiencing, acting subjects whose experiences 
and actions are described in terms of sensations, beliefs and intentions, and the 
subpersonal level, where these same phenomena are described in causal and mechanistic 
terms of the states of the brain and nervous system. 
The idea that there is a subpersonal, causal-mechanistic level of explanation in our 
mental lives gave rise to the problem of how to explain the content of these states, and 
similarly, how to explain the relation between these subpersonal states and corresponding 
personal level states. Although it seems blatantly anachronistic not to accept causal-
mechanistic explanations of mental phenomena such as pain and colour sensations at a 
subpersonal level, it is not thereby given what kind of content these subpersonal states 
have and how to connect them with a personal level explanation. The relation between 
the subpersonal and the personal brings out a complex cluster of questions on content and 
representation, and – congenial to our purpose – juxtaposes different ways of 
understanding the question about a possible nonconceptual content in experience. 
To adopt McDowell’s words: the subpersonal informational system that Dennett 
draws up in Content and Consciousness is, “a physical mechanism, connected to its 
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surroundings by transducers that convert physical impacts from outside into events of the 
sort that the system can work on, and perhaps by transducers that convert the system’s 
end products into physical interventions in the exterior.”225 The subpersonal system is, as 
he goes on to paraphrase Dennett, “a syntactic engine, not a semantic engine.”226 This 
description of the subpersonal as a syntactic engine had its roots in Chomsky’s radical 
idea that there are “cognitive states that are inaccessible to consciousness, states of tacit 
knowledge of syntactical rules”227: in short, that our knowledge of a language is governed 
by tacitly known syntactical rules of a generative grammar. 
This forceful idea inspired not only Dennett but also much of the ensuing work in the 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and it even led some, such as Stephen Stich, to 
argue for a complete syntactic theory of the mind. That all content – both personal level 
and subpersonal level content is best described in terms of a syntactic content.228 
However, in an early paper, preceding his developed account of the syntactic theory of 
the mind, Stich explored the distinction between a subpersonal level and a personal level 
at a more specific area of the debate – that of belief-formation – by developing a 
dichotomy between subdoxastic states and beliefs, contrasting “the belief that p with the 
subdoxastic state which stores or represents the information that p”229 – an idea that 
seems at least reminiscent of the idea of a nonconceptual state of information, which we 
encountered in the quote from Evans above. Nevertheless, with respect to what it actually 
means that a subdoxastic state represent, Stich claims to be able to ‘duck the issue’: “For 
though this talk of states representing facts is difficult to explicate in a philosophically 
tolerable way, it is surprisingly easy to master intuitively.”230 In his later accounts, as we 
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saw, Stich’s suggestion that even personal level representation can be described as simply 
syntactical representation surpasses the former distinction between beliefs and 
subdoxastic states. But Stich’s initial vagueness in defining subpersonal content, and later 
boldness in equating all representation with syntactic content, seems to bring out neatly 
how discomforting the notion of representation is when attributed to the subpersonal. The 
idea seems to foster that one either bites the bullet and embraces the somewhat 
undesirable result that personal mental representation is simply syntactical representation, 
or that one engages in the difficult task of trying to get personal level semantic content 
out of syntax. 
In contrast to Stich’s syntactic reduction of the mind, it is part of Dennett’s theory 
that “the subpersonal level of description and explanation, the kinds of occurrences that 
are described … in purely mechanistic terms … are not to be identified with the 
sensations and actions of persons.”231 But, in what seems to be a contradiction and an 
obliteration of the dichotomy just developed, Dennett appears to open for the possibility 
that subpersonal descriptions may be “upgraded into an Intentional description”232. As 
numerous commentators have noted: it seems difficult to reconcile this belief in the 
possibility of an ‘upgraded’ subpersonal content with the previously developed 
distinction, without actually collapsing the distinction between the personal and 
subpersonal level. According to Davies, Dennett tries to have it both ways by claiming 
that the “relation between Intentional descriptions of events, states or structures (as 
signals that carry certain messages or memory traces with certain contents) and 
extensional descriptions of them is one of further interpretation.”233 Dennett’s proposed 
solution, in other words, is to introduce intermediate levels of interpretation, or sub-
systems of the subpersonal, taking us from a purely syntactic description of subpersonal 
content to full-fledged personal intentional content.234 But as Hornsby says; 
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“Dennett’s continued insistence on the importance of his personal/subpersonal distinction becomes 
hard to fathom when properties visible at the personal level [e.g. desires and intentions] are meant to be the 
products of a stance that is equally appropriately adopted towards sub-personal things.”235 
 
The difficulty leaves us, according to Davies, with two choices of how to understand 
the distinction between the two levels; either to hold that the attribution to subpersonal 
states of intentional content is not meant to be literal – that the content attributed to these 
states is merely ‘as if’ content – or, alternatively, to relax the distinction between 
subpersonal and personal states so as “to allow that personal-level intentionality is the 
product of adopting a stance that can just as well be adopted towards subpersonal-level 
systems.”236 The first is, according to Davies, McDowell’s preferred explanation, 
whereas the second represents the one most commonly adopted in recent philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science.237 
In fact, McDowell’s paper “The Content of Perceptual Experience” seems to be more 
or less exclusively devoted to debunking Dennett’s later suggestion that the content of 
subpersonal states can be properly described by adopting an ‘intentional stance’. In 
taking up Dennett’s thought experiment – what the frog’s ‘subpersonal’ visual processing 
is supposed to tell the frog – McDowell argues that; 
 
“nobody knows how to make sense of an animal’s internal control mechanism, and connect it 
conceptually to the competence it is supposed to explain, except by describing it as if it were, what we 
know it is not really, a semantic engine, interpreting inputs as signs of environmental facts and, as output, 
directing behaviour so as to be suitable to those facts in the light of the animal’s needs or goals.”238 
 
While McDowell does not dismiss subpersonal content tout court – subpersonal 
content described as ‘as if’ content can “pull its weight in addressing a genuine 
explanatory need” – the question that preoccupies McDowell is “what enables us animals 
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to be the semantic engines we are.”239 But the temptation to see “dealings with content on 
the part of animals [i.e. at the personal level] as somehow constitutively explained in 
terms of information-processing in their interiors … is disastrous”, for the simple reason 
that “if we offer a constitutive explanation of genuine content in terms of a merely ‘as if’ 
attribution of content, we make genuine content fragile and problematic.”240 
Two things seems evident from what McDowell says here: firstly, that ‘genuine 
content’, i.e. content at the personal level, is semantic content, or, which comes to the 
same for McDowell, intentional content. And secondly, that by attempting to construe 
personal level content from subpersonal level content, we make the question of how we 
can be semantic engines a difficult one. As he says somewhat later: “the attempt to see a 
constitutive relation between the lower and upper levels undermines our hold on the fact 
that animals are semantic engines.”241 However, this brings out a crucial point in the 
discussion on nonconceptual content. For whereas McDowell dismisses the idea that 
personal level content is a ‘welling up to the surface’ of subpersonal ‘content’, 
safeguarding Dennett’s initial distinction between a syntactic subpersonal level and a 
semantically determinable personal level, José Bermúdez seems explicitly in the errand 
of welding the two levels of explanation. And he does so by addressing the question of 
the relationship between the levels of explanation, through a discussion of nonconceptual 
content; by considering, as he says, the “important structural commonalities”242 between 
states with conceptual content (i.e. personal level states) and the different classes of states 
with nonconceptual content – hereunder, he will argue, subpersonal states. 
The first paragraph of Bermúdez’s “Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual 
Experience to Subpersonal Computational States” discloses, in a nutshell, his views on 
nonconceptual content, and the relation he sees between the debate on nonconceptual 
content and that on personal versus subpersonal content. He opens the paper by asking: 
“How distinctive are the cognitive processes, such as beliefs, desires, hopes and fears, 
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which constitutively involve the possession of concepts?”243 If there are states “that 
possess content although they do not require possession of the concepts needed to specify 
that content” – i.e. states with a nonconceptual content – which “recent work in 
philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences” seems to suggest, then “this suggests that 
the concept-involving states which have long been thought of as the only means by which 
cognition can take place are not really so distinctive after all.”244 We are nudged towards 
accepting that if there are states with a nonconceptual representational content, then the 
contribution from these states should not be seen as second-rate in comparison with the 
contribution from conceptual states in explaining our cognition. 
Bermúdez initial claim is that there are such states: “Conceptual and nonconceptual 
contents are distinguished not by whether they are representational, but according to how 
they represent.”245 This is restated even more explicitly a few pages on: 
 
“Conceptual and nonconceptual content are both forms of content because there is a single notion of 
representation applicable to both of them.”246 
 
A large part of Bermúdez’s paper takes the form of drawing up this single notion of 
representation – ‘the important structural commonality’ that he finds between conceptual 
and nonconceptual content. In doing so, he identifies four criteria for counting as 
representing, but the most obvious requirement on such a notion of representation is of 
course that it does not “rule out the notion of nonconceptual content as a matter of 
definition”247. If we are able to provide a notion of representation freed of the 
requirement from conceptuality, we may, “When confronted with states that are 
candidates for the ascription of nonconceptual content … ask whether these states satisfy 
the four conditions of content and thus qualify as representational states.”248 
Having established that there is such a general account of representation applicable at 
the personal level, he then goes on to argue by analogy that the same holds at the 
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subpersonal level.249 Now that the notion of representation is liberated from any 
conceptual requirements, there is at least no a priori reason why subpersonal content 
should not be able to qualify as representational. In fact, the criteria Bermúdez lists for 
being representational seems well adapted to comprise also subpersonal content.250 But 
this move signals an important re-description of the issues under discussion: the 
discussion is no longer over whether or not there can be a concept-independent notion of 
content or representation in our experiences, but whether there is content or 
representation at the subpersonal level. In short, the notion of a nonconceptual content in 
perception is used to establish a singular notion of content or representation, which is 
then used as a lever to argue for representation or content at the subpersonal level. This is 
no surprise, as Bermúdez himself says in a later paper; “one of the guiding assumptions 
of cognitive science … is that subpersonal information processing is genuinely 
representational.”251 
However, it is precisely the application of a notion of representation at the 
subpersonal level that distinguishes Bermúdez’s understanding of the debate on 
nonconceptual content from that of McDowell’s. Although an interesting discussion in 
itself, the question of whether or not subpersonal states can be said to be truly 
representational or not, is not part of the debate on nonconceptual content as McDowell 
sees it, but lies, on the contrary, prior to or outside the debate.252 As Davies makes clear, 
for those who view subpersonal content as ‘as if’ content “it may seem that the appeal to 
unconscious representations and tacitly known rules involves a kind of category mistake 
in which distinctively personal-level notions, such as representation and rule, are applied 
at a subpersonal level of description.”253 And as we saw above, McDowell’s complaint 
was precisely that in attempting to construe personal level content from subpersonal 
‘content’ we loose our grip on ‘genuine content’. 
It seems therefore that Bermúdez has prejudged the issue and excluded himself from 
any further discussion with McDowell over nonconceptual content – at least as McDowell 
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understands the issue. Bermúdez may, of course, insist on his understanding of the debate 
and continue to discuss nonconceptual content as he sees it, viz. so as to include the 
subpersonal. Or, alternatively, he may continue to discuss the relation between the 
personal and the subpersonal – a question McDowell has similarly addressed. But it is 
clear that neither of these debates coincide with what McDowell takes the debate on 
nonconceptual content to be about. It may seem that whether or not one allows a notion 
of subpersonal representation is an assumption, which determines two incompatible ways 
of understanding what the debate on nonconceptual content is about: for Bermúdez, the 
issue is to explain how the personal and the subpersonal alike can be said to represent, 
through a notion of representation or content which is independent of our concept-
possession; for McDowell, the question is not about the subpersonal at all, but whether or 
not all personal level content can be said to be constituted by concepts. By McDowell’s 
lights, defining ‘representational’ such that it embraces subpersonal content is simply a 
non-starter, but that is not because McDowell’s constraints rules out any discussion of 
nonconceptual content per definition. McDowell’s framing of the question on 
nonconceptual content does rule out subpersonal content – it is simply a contradiction in 
terms – but there is still the issue whether all personal level content must be 
conceptual.254 
If we set aside suggestions that develop the idea of a nonconceptual content in the 
direction of a subpersonal content, and those – which we discussed above – that frame the 
debate in terms of the possession of concepts, we have narrowed the scope down 
considerably. But are there still other conceptions of the debate that ‘cuts the pie’ 
differently from that of McDowell? In contrast to Crane, who appears to pursue the 
notion of a nonconceptual content directly from the perspective of mental states, and 
whether or not we need to possess concepts in order to have an experience with that 
content, Michael Ayers conceives of the debate on nonconceptual content in terms of 
what he takes to be a prior question; that of the acquisition of concepts. As such, he 
construes the debate as a modern version of an age-old question in philosophy; whether 
we abstract concepts from experience, or, if concepts are somehow prior to experience. 
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According to Ayers, we must be able to stand in intentional relations in order to 
acquire concepts, i.e. that the intentional relation comes before conceptuality. This may 
simply sound like a reversion to Evans’s suggestion, who claimed that we are presented 
with a nonconceptual input, that are then conceptualized. But in acting as input to a 
concept-possessing system, Evans says nothing of how those concepts are acquired in the 
first place. Nor does Crane, who merely claims that we need not possess the concepts in 
order to have an intentional experience. But is this suggestion compatible with 
McDowell’s? In contrast to the other two suggestions so far explored, Ayers takes 
himself explicitly to be engaging with and criticising McDowell’s conceptualism. In the 
following section I discuss Ayers conception of what the debate is about and how it 
relates to McDowell’s understanding of the debate – as well as a criticism of Ayers by 
Hannah Ginsborg, and a how her suggestion may mitigate the worry that Ayers’s 
criticism raises for a conceptualist position, although Ayers’s conception of the debate, 
seems, in the end, not be what McDowell takes to be at issue. 
 
V. Intentionality and Conceptuality 
Michael Ayers tries to drive a wedge between intentionality and conceptuality – to 
borrow a phrase from Hannah Ginsborg – by arguing that conceptualism holds a view on 
concept-possession that is either self-defeating strong or vacuous. On the strong version 
of conceptualism, which Ayers takes McDowell to subscribe to, “the possession of a 
concept is either the same as, or extremely closely related to, the possession of a 
linguistic capacity.”255 Ayers argues that if the conceptualist adopts this demanding 
version, upholding that one needs to be in possession of a language to entertain 
intentional experiential content, her position is both implausible and flies in the face of 
the empiricist principle that experience precedes concepts. For it seems clear that “I can 
see something as a trapezium without knowing the meaning either of the term 
‘trapezium’, or of any of its synonyms.”256 Or, in a form emphasising the high demands 
on concept-possession under the strong version of conceptualism: it seems clear that I do 
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not need to possess the word ‘trapezium’ to perceive something as a trapezium. On the 
other hand – on a weak version of conceptualism – maintaining that to possess a concept 
simply requires that we be able to discriminate objects perceptually seems to be quite 
trivial and therefore too weak to support any interesting version of conceptualism. 
 In his “Can there be a New Empiricism?” Ayers attempts to undermine any 
attraction conceptualism may have by establishing a version of empiricism that does not 
fall to the ‘Myth of the Given’, while at the same time keeping the empiricist principle 
that, as he says: “In general, experience comes before concepts, and it is because we 
experience the world as we do that we are in a position to acquire the concepts 
appropriate to any account of things in the world, or of that experience.”257 His arguments 
seems therefore to open up a third way of describing the debate on nonconceptual 
content, different to the other mentioned, both in that it claims that the proper line of 
attack is through a critical look at the relation between language and language 
acquisition, and intentionality (where Crane and Bermúdez seems to discuss mental states 
or the content of subpersonal experience directly), and as a result of this, that all 
experiential content is nonconceptual. Disagreeing with Ayers that intentionality can be 
separated from conceptuality, Ginsborg nevertheless follows Ayers in his characteristic 
of the debate, arguing that although, “Empiricist commitments along these lines figure to 
some degree in the work of other nonconceptualists … it is only in Ayers’s work that we 
find such a forthright and clearly articulated characterization of what is fundamentally at 
stake in the debate over nonconceptual content.”258  
The empiricism Ayers seeks to establish is not new as such, but trades off an older, 
now largely forgotten version stemming from Hobbes. According to Ayers, Hobbes’s 
version has been generally ignored, discarded as outdate and surpassed by versions set 
forth by Hume and Russell. However, although with time more refined and sophisticated 
than Hobbes’s early aspirings, in limiting ourselves to these newer versions of 
empiricism we loose out on recourses to counter the arguments against the ‘Myth of the 
Given’.259 And as he says, “It is a real and, surely, important question whether there is a 
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tenable position, reasonably describable as Empiricism on both historical and 
philosophical grounds, lying between the kind of view that critics of the Myth have 
refuted and the kind of view that they in general adopt as its alternative.”260 
The problem facing empiricism is, in Ayers words, a close relation of the ‘binding 
problem’261 stemming from Descartes’s attack on empiricism; “that we cannot even take 
a piece of wax undergoing sensible change to be the same from moment to moment 
without an innate concept of an extended, flexible, and mutable substance”262. Or as he 
says a page later; that “an intellectual concept must be added to what is given in order to 
make possible the perceptual reidentification of bodies over time.”263 
In particular, the problem appears to arise for empiricists following Locke, as a result 
of the attempt to combine two ideas; on the one hand, that we in experience are faced 
with “objects of infallible immediate perception or acquaintance”, and secondly, that 
these experiences have a “molecular structure [and thus can be broken down] into atomic 
simples”264 Because Locke saw our perception of objects as complex, built out of atomic 
simples – a move that was meant to explain how we can think of things we have never 
experienced – the ‘binding problem’ seems to get a foothold and threatens to undermine 
our knowledge of objects. According to Ayers, the only alternative that has been 
acknowledged to this view, is “some version of a broadly (if usually heretically) Kantian 
model of experience as the application of intellectual concepts to sensory input”265. 
However, Locke’s compositionalism is not the only option available to empiricism. 
On Hobbes’s view, “there is no talk of the combination of simple sensible qualities to 
form complex ideas of substantial things.”266 Instead of the bottom-up approach adopted 
by Locke, on Hobbes’s empiricism “no such binding problem exists just because it holds 
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that in primitive sense-experience individual bodies in space are already presented as 
physically discrete and unitary objects”267. This suggests the basis for a different view of 
the relation between experience and intentionality, a view that does not impose the 
possession of a language as a necessary requirement for object-directed thought or 
intentionality. On a Hobbesian empiricism, we do not need to possess a prior set of 
concepts in order for our experiences to present us with a unitary intentional content. On 
the contrary, concepts inherit their intentionality from the only way we sense objects, 
from the ‘primitive sense-experiences of individual, discrete bodies’.268 Hobbes’s 
empiricism seems therefore to be able to maintain an intentional relation to the content of 
experience and its empiricist fundament that experience is prior to concepts. However, is 
this a conclusive proof that we are not obliged to accept a McDowellian conceptualism as 
the only alternative to the ‘Myth of the Given’? How plausible is Ayers attempt to 
separate intentionality and conceptuality? And how accurate is his characterisation of the 
debate on nonconceptual content – at least as a criticism of McDowell? 
 As we have seen, Ginsborg professes to accept Ayers’s characterisation of the 
debate, but argues that his attempt at separating intentionality and conceptuality fails. In 
criticising Ayers she therefore tries to disprove his claim that “one cannot consistently be 
both an Empiricist and Conceptualist”269 by presenting a version of conceptualism 
“which goes some way towards meeting his criticisms, and which, in particular, respects 
the empiricist intuitions which he rightly emphasizes.”270 I find Ginsborg’s suggestion 
illuminating, yielding a plausible conceptualism that seems able to fend of some of the 
most serious nonconceptualist challenges in play. However, in doing so I think she comes 
much closer to McDowell’s own suggestion than she realizes. In criticizing Ayers and 
setting out her own suggestion she draws a number of distinctions that I believe takes her 
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away from Ayers’s characterization of the fundamental issue under discussion in the 
nonconceptual-debate – a characterization which I believe is mistaken when it comes to 
what McDowell takes himself to be arguing – and to a proper understanding of what the 
debate is fundamentally about. In the end, it seems that Ginsborg only upholds the 
‘empiricist principle’ in a version that is modified to suit her own suggestion and which I 
believe is compatible with conceptualism as advocated by McDowell. Before discussing 
Ginsborg’s view and drawing attention to the connections I see between her view and 
McDowell’s, let me attempt to make clear why I take Ayers’s characterization of the 
nonconceptual-debate to be misguided as a description pertaining to McDowell’s 
conceptualism. 
 In elaborating on a new Hobbesian-inspired empiricism that is not vulnerable to the 
‘Myth of the Given’, while remaining faithful to the empiricist principle that experience 
precedes thought, Ayers argues, as we have seen, that the only alternative that has been 
acknowledged is a “broadly (if usually heretically) Kantian model of experience as the 
application of intellectual concepts to sensory input”.271 However, as a description of the 
position taken up by McDowell this seems quite wrong. McDowell explicitly says that, 
“The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity … It is not that they are 
exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity.”272 And as he goes on to say, 
“We should understand what Kant calls “intuition” – experiential intake – not as a bare 
getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state that already has 
conceptual content. In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and 
so.”
273
 In fact, the idea that there is a pre-conceptual or extra-conceptual given in 
experience that only becomes conceptualised once we employ our concepts on 
experience is precisely Evans’s version of nonconceptualism – which, according to 
McDowell, is an example of the ‘Myth of the Given’ and as such singled out as one of 
the main targets for criticism in Mind and World. It is nevertheless here, at what he takes 
to be an example of an illegitimate view on the relation between concepts and experience, 
that Ayers directs his main attack against conceptualism and McDowell in particular: by 
challenging what he takes to be a central conceptualist adherence to the principle that pre-
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existing concepts are applied on experience – that, in contrast to the empiricist principle, 
concepts precede experience. But in addition to being his main objection to Evans, 
McDowell never discusses the empiricist principle or its Kantian counterpart as Ayers 
understands them. That is, McDowell does not discuss the acquisition of concepts but the 
role of concepts in experience in mature, concepts-possessing individuals. Throughout 
Mind and World McDowell’s discussion is focused on the experience of individuals that 
already possesses concepts, limiting the discussion of the sense experience of animals 
and young children that are said not to possess concepts to a few scattered remarks here 
and there. The debate on nonconceptual content is therefore not about whether concepts 
precede experience or vice versa – whether we abstract concepts from experience, or 
employ innate concepts in experience – but whether mature, adult human experience is 
conceptual or not, in the following sense, which I believe comes out perspicuously in the 
disagreement between Evans and McDowell: whether there in experience is a pre-
conceptual given, which may be conceptualized if input to a concept-applying system, as 
Evans claims,274 or, if in experiencing, we ‘see that things are thus and so’ through our 
passive employment of concepts. Although there are a number of similarities between 
Evans and McDowell’s positions I believe we come the closest to seeing the core of what 
is at stake in the debate on nonconceptual content by emphasising the difference between 
the two. While McDowell acknowledges that we share a sensitivity to features of our 
environment with animals (which do not possess concepts), he disagrees with Evans that 
we can factorise our experiences into a concept-dependent component and a concept-
independent sensitivity. We cannot, as he says, “factorise the truth about us into 
independent components”, or in the Kantian jargon that he most often employs, “separate 
sensibility from understanding”.275 According to McDowell, it is in other words not 
possible to separate off a nonconceptual component of our experience. 
 This is, however, quite different from Ayers’ characterisation of the debate. But to 
further emphasise the distance between what Ayers takes the debate on nonconceptual 
content to be about and what McDowell actually seems to discuss, it appears, in fact, that 
McDowell would be in a position to accept some kind of empiricist story of how we 
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acquire concepts along the lines Ayers suggests. Towards the end of Mind and World 
McDowell sets forth the view that the “language into which a human being is first initiate 
stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an 
orientation to the world.” 276 And as he goes on, “if an individual human being is to 
realize her potential of taking her place in that succession [of mindedness vested in 
language], which is the same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think and act 
intentionally, at all, the first thing that needs to happen is for her to be initiate into a 
tradition as it stands.”277 However, this clearly emphasises that for an infant to 
(eventually) enter the sphere of conceptual thought, it must be initiated into a concept-
using community; it must somehow acquire those concepts in moving from a state where 
it does not possess concepts to becoming a fully mature, concept using individual.278 
 Leaving Ayers’s conception of the nonconceptual debate aside, Hannah Ginsborg 
challenges Ayers’s claim that a conceptualist must choose between an implausible and a 
trivial position, seeking to develop a conceptualist view that does not hold a view on 
concept possession that is overly strong, nor vacuous. Although she claims to follow 
Ayers’s characterisation of the nonconceptual debate, she immediately sets herself apart 
from Ayers’s empiricist principle, arguing that her position: 
 
 “differs from a commonly invoked stereotype of Kantianism in that, rather than drawing on Kant’s 
account of the categories and their relation to experience, it appeals to his account of empirical concepts. 
This means, as we will see, that it does not commit us to a view on which experience is shaped by a set of 
concepts which we possess antecedently to any experience. Rather it makes room for the idea that empirical 
concepts are possible only in, and through, experience.”279 
 
 In making this qualification I believe she radically parts with Ayers, for she no 
longer faces the imagined conceptualist recipient of Ayers’s criticism. On the other hand, 
her ensuing point on Kant aligns her with a central feature in McDowell’s conceptualism, 
which he on his side traces to and adopts from Wittgenstein. Instead of assuming a 
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distorted ‘conceptualist principle’, in which our experience is structured by our pre-
existing concepts, we may insist “that our imaginative activity can be, and be recognized 
by us, as rule-governed, without our having any awareness of the relevant rules prior to 
engaging in that activity.”280 This suggestion, which she takes “to be a consequence of 
the account of aesthetic experience which [Kant] gives in the Critique of Judgment”281 is 
supported by her distinction between seeing something in a certain way, and seeing 
something as being a certain way. The distinction is subtle but extremely forceful: 
“Perceiving something in a certain way is not equivalent to being disposed to sort it in a 
certain way, but it can be characterized as what it is about a creature’s conscious state 
which accounts for its sorting it in that way.”282 Thus, perceiving something in a certain 
way is not equivalent to being disposed to see it as being a certain way, or as she says: “A 
subject can have a characteristic way of perceiving red things, one that enables her to 
discriminate them from things of other colours, without perceiving them as red, or indeed 
as having any features at all.”283 A subject may in other words have a way of seeing or 
sorting things, without having any awareness of the rules governing the sorting activity, 
to make the connection to the Kantian principle explicit. However, Ginsborg argues that 
our seeing or sorting objects can nevertheless be recognized as rule-governed in a 
different sense, a sense which she describes as “more promising as a basis for an account 
of concepts: that of a way in which one ought to perceive something.”284Although, as she 
says, the most pressing point is to explain the normativity of this ‘ought’, there are a 
number of similarities between her suggestion and McDowell’s Wittgensteinian 
treatment of rule-following. 
 In “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, McDowell describes the idea on what it 
is to follow a rule which he sets out to undermine in the following terms: 
  
 “What counts as doing the same thing, within the practice in question, is fixed by its rules. The rules 
mark out rails along which correct activity within the practice must run. These rails are there anyway, 
independent of the responses that characterize a participant in the practice, that a series of correct moves in 
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the practice really is a case of going on doing the same thing.”285  
 
 But, as McDowell says, “the idea that the rules of a practice marks out rails 
traceable independently of the reactions of participants is suspect even in the apparently 
ideal case [of adding ‘two’ to a preceding number].”286 In fact, “there is nothing that 
keeps our practices in line except the reactions and responses we learn in learning 
them.”287 It seems to me that this is not only compatible with Ginsborg’s notion of 
following a rule, which she takes from Kant, but similar in the main idea that abidance by 
a rule is not abidance by some pre-existing, independent Platonic idea (‘rails stretching to 
infinity’), but engagement in an ongoing human activity. As Ginsborg says; 
 
 “The approach which I am suggesting reverses a certain traditional conception of how a grasp of 
rules is related to an activity’s being, and being recognized as, governed by rules. On the traditional 
conception, we cannot engage in a rule-governed activity without first grasping a linguistically articulable 
set of rules which then are available to guide us in the performance of the activity. We assess the 
correctness or incorrectness of our performances of the activity in terms of how successful we are in 
conforming to the rules which guide us. But on the conception that I am suggesting, we can learn to engage 
in a rule-governed activity without antecedently grasping the rules that govern it. We acquire a grasp of the 
rules simply by virtue of becoming competent in the activity, as long as the performance of the activity itself 
involves the awareness that, in performing it, we are by and large performing it as we ought.”288 
 
 In particular the last emphasized segment of this passage seems reminiscent of 
McDowell’s view on rule-following. However, whereas McDowell’s discussion of rule-
following remains detached from the discussion on nonconceptual content, Ginsborg’s 
distinction between seeing something a certain way, and seeing something as being as 
certain way allows us to see much clearer how the idea can be put to use in this context. 
In particular, Ginsborg takes this view to undermine Christopher Peacocke’s suggestion 
that there is a nonconceptual ‘mode’ in experience. For in invoking a ‘mode’ under which 
something is represented, the two senses of seeing are conflated, which the following 
passage that Ginsborg quotes from Peacocke vividly shows: 
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 “The idea that a nonlinguistic creature sees a shape as a diamond rather than as square does not seem 
to me to be philosophically objectionable. One can envisage sorting experiments, or forced-choice tests 
sensitive to perceived similarity relations, which give empirical evidence that the creature has seen the 
shape one way rather than another”289. 
 
 As Ginsborg here points out, the first ‘see’ is intended as ‘seeing something as 
being’, the second use of ‘see’ is the ‘seeing something a certain way’. But if we adhere 
to the distinction, it becomes clear that whereas seeing an object a certain way is a 
possibility open to perceivers lacking concepts (in McDowell’s words, sensitivity to the 
environment), seeing an object as being a certain way is strictly dependent on the 
possession of concepts. Alternatively: that to see an object as being a certain way simply 
is to possess those concepts. This version is, as Ginsborg says, weaker than the strong 
version of conceptualism, which demands that to see an object as being a certain way 
requires a language, and it is stronger than merely equating concept-possession with 
sorting-abilities; it requires, in addition, that we are sensitive to how we ought to apply 
the concept, or similarly, “to the reaction and responses we learn in learning them”.290 
 Ginsborg’s suggestion shows, I believe, not how to defend a conceptualism while 
maintaining Ayers’s empiricist principle – which I do not think that there is any need to 
worry about anyway, as conceptualism can be made to be compatible with an empiricist 
account of concept-acquisition (the issue is, regardless of whether this can be done or not, 
not the essential issue) – but how to develop a cogent conceptualism that addresses the 
real issues underlying the nonconceptualist debate, visible in Evans and McDowell’s 
disagreement: whether concepts are applied on or in experience. I take Ginsborg to 
support McDowell in arguing that we cannot see an object as being a certain way without 
possessing the relevant concepts, which is the same as saying that we cannot have an 
intentional or representational experience without possessing the concepts involved. At 
the same time, Ginsborgs notion of ‘seeing something a certain way’ provides McDowell 
with a satisfying account of the sensitivity he attributes to animals and young children. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The three approaches here discussed seem to construe the debate on nonconceptual 
content in three rather different ways, and most importantly for our concern; they seem 
all to draw up the debate in quite different terms from that of McDowell. In so far as 
McDowell is taken to be the conceptualist par excellence, and ‘conceptualism’ something 
that stands or falls with him – as many seem to think – it should go without saying that 
one needs to be clear on what McDowell actually takes himself to be committed to with 
his claim that the content of our experience is conceptual. However, too much of the 
debate on nonconceptual content seem mired in a lack of clarity on what the debate on 
nonconceptual content is a debate about, and it seems that the proper question to ask 
should not be ‘what is nonconceptual content?’ – as if one could find one answer – but, 
‘in what different ways have the idea of a nonconceptual content been developed?’. 
In Tim Crane’s case, it seems that nonconceptual content is tied to the question of 
whether or not a subject, in having an experience, needs to possess the concepts that 
would be used in giving a canonical description of that experience. As such, Crane 
conceives the debate as being about the requirements on concept-possession that faces an 
experiencing subject. However, this common way of conceiving the debate frames the 
question in terms that are at odds with McDowell’s understanding of the issue: in contrast 
to Crane’s focus on the nonconceptual nature of mental states, McDowell takes the 
question to be about the content of perceptual states. 
Differing from Crane, José Bermúdez develops the idea of a nonconceptual content 
at the level of the subpersonal. That there could be representation or content at the level 
of states of the perceptual system, a kind of content which – in virtue of belonging to a 
sub-personal level – would not be describable as conceptual. This takes the debate on 
nonconceptual content in a different direction – one returning the focus of the debate to 
the content of those subpersonal experiences – but it is a view that McDowell 
straightforwardly dismisses. For McDowell, subpersonal “content” is only ‘as if’ content, 
and has nothing to do with the content of personal level perceptual experiences. As he 
says, it is a confusion to take a legitimate notion in cognitive psychology as having 
anything to do at the level of acting subjects. Although there seems to be an increasing 
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trend to perceive the question in those terms291, for McDowell the issue of nonconceptual 
content is a question that belongs on a very different arena. 
Michael Ayers, on his side, takes the issue in yet another direction by characterizing 
the debate in terms of an ancient philosophical problem; as addressing the near perennial 
question whether we acquire concepts through experiences, or, if our way of perceiving 
the world depends on a prior conceptual ability. However, nor does this way of 
construing the debate seem to do justice to the way McDowell conceives of it. Whereas 
Ayers focuses on the acquisition of concepts, McDowell’s focus is not on how we come 
to possess concepts but on how best to characterise the perceptual experience of concept-
possessors. Although an interesting question, as he says, the evolutionary account of how 
we have come to possess a language is not the philosophical question that drives 
McDowell. 
The preceding has not been an attempt to given an exhaustive genealogy of the 
development of the debate on nonconceptual content – in what directions the idea has 
been developed, and whether the various suggestions are compatible or not – but merely 
to give a brief sketch of three, very different suggestions in play. The state of the debate 
is plagued by a lack of clarity on the important point of making it clear what the various 
contenders are taking the debate to be about, and my agenda in sketching these three 
different conceptions of the debate has been no more than to draw attention to this deficit 
in an ongoing and increasingly ramified debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. To 
point to the need for a greater self-consciousness in determining what the debate is a 
debate about. A number of other ways in which the debate has been developed has 
therefore had to be bypassed in the rough sketch here presented, and a more thorough 
picture would, in addition to fill out the barely commenced survey, have to deal with such 
important but overlooked questions in the debate as ‘what is meant by a concept?’, and 
‘what is it to possess a concept?’. It is quite interesting that these questions are not 
addressed to a greater extent in the literature than they are, and a survey of the various 
suggestions would probably reveal that one reason for the diversity of ways in which the 
idea of a nonconceptual content has been developed is due to the difference in view on 
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these questions.292 
However, for McDowell, the debate on nonconceptual content seems in the end 
constrained to a rather narrow existence within the debate on the relation between mind 
and world that is at issue between him and Evans. As we saw above, at issue is Evans’s 
suggestion that “when we make judgements about the perceptible world, we must be 
converting experiential content of a kind we share with mere animals, so that it must be 
nonconceptual, into conceptual form.”293 However, for McDowell there is an important 
difference between “a merely animal mode of life, in an environment, and a human mode 
of life, in the world.”294 Whereas animals have at best a kind of ‘proto-subjectivity’, the 
human mode of life is raised “above the pressure of biological need”, and is characterised 
by – borrowing a phrase from Gadamer – a “free distances orientation” to the world.295 In 
contrast to the proto-subjectivity of animals, adult humans have genuine subjectivity 
through their conceptual abilities. And it is the explanatory potential that the notion of a 
conceptual content has in providing concept-possessing humans with a standing in the 
world, an intentional relation to the reality, that motivates the claim that our experience is 
already conceptual: it is the crucial role conceptual content plays in bridging the mind 
and world that accounts for McDowell’s conception of the debate on nonconceptual 
content. As he says towards the end of the lectures, 
 
“It is the spontaneity of the understanding, the power of conceptual thinking, that brings both the 
world and the self into view. Creatures without conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and – this is 
part of the same package – experience of objective reality.”296 
 
Only through a conceptual relation to the world do we acquire a mind, a way of 
conceiving how experience can stand in a justificatory relation to the mind: how the 
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mind, defined by its rational relations, and the world, how things are, come to be related. 
For McDowell, it seems to be this the debate on a nonconceptual content is about. 
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Essay III. A Semantic Solution to the Generic Problem 
 
I. Introduction 
In some of his semantic works, McDowell seeks to defend a view that seems to play a 
fundamental role in his philosophy of mind and language: that there is room for de re 
thoughts or utterances within a Fregean theory of sense which respects Frege’s seminal 
distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.297 A way of seeing this is as an attempt at 
construing a semantic solution to the generic problem of how the mind can be related to 
the world. As McDowell makes clear in his “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner 
Space”: a reason to pursue a notion of singular propositions, or object-dependent thought, 
 
“is the interest of its radically anti-Cartesian implications. In a fully Cartesian picture, the inner life 
takes place in an autonomous realm, transparent to the introspective awareness of its subject; the access of 
subjectivity to the rest of the world becomes correspondingly problematic, in a way that has familiar 
manifestations in the mainstream of post-Cartesian epistemology. If we let there be quasi-Russellian 
singular propositions about, say, ordinary perceptible objects among the contents of inner space, we can no 
longer be regarding inner space as a locus of configurations that are self-standing, not beholden to external 
conditions; and there is now no question of a gulf, which it might be the task of philosophy to try to bridge, 
or to declare unabridgeable, between the realm of subjectivity and the world of ordinary objects.”298 
 
The first line of the quote here given seems to invoke precisely the dualism between 
mind and world that McDowell, in its specific epistemological form, addresses in Mind 
and World: between an autonomous coherentist ‘spinning in the void’, which can provide 
no external justification to our beliefs, and treating warrant as simply given in experience. 
And the second line of the quote seems no less clearly to argue that by introducing 
‘quasi-Russellian’ singular propositions – de re, or object-dependent propositions – the 
problem is made to go away. As McDowell would like to keep the strength and 
advantages – the fine-grained thoughts – that a theory of sense allows, while nevertheless 
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securing a relation to the world, it seems therefore essential that he find some way of 
informing a Fregean theory with a Russellian notion of object-dependent thought.299 
However, according to most interpreters of Frege, the notion of de re thoughts or 
utterances simply cannot be made to cohere with the distinction between Sinn and 
Bedeutung. It is argued that Frege’s view of sense, on what appears to be a commonly 
adopted interpretation, that “all thought about concrete individuals is indirect, mediated 
by senses that are independent of those individuals” rules out any notion of de re sense – 
a notion, which is taken to mean; “senses whose existence and identity is dependent upon 
their reference”300. In the opening lines of his “De Re Senses”, McDowell notes this 
opposition to bringing de re thoughts or utterances into a Fregean framework, saying that: 
 
“It is commonly believed that a Fregean philosophy of language and thought can represent an 
utterance, or a propositional attitude, as being about an object only by crediting it with a content that 
determines the object by specification, or at least in such a way that the content is available to be thought or 
expressed whether the object exists or not. To resist this restriction would be to hold out for the idea that 
utterances and thoughts can be essentially de re; and that idea is supposed to be incapable of being made to 
fit within the framework provided by the theory of sense and Bedeutung.”301 
 
The problem facing McDowell and his opponents in determining whether or not 
Fregean senses can be said to be de re may at first seem like a straightforward exegetical 
question: is there textual evidence to back-up the claim that de re thoughts are compatible 
with Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, or do the texts firmly rule out the 
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compatibility of de re or object-dependent thoughts with that distinction? However, 
rather than engaging in an interpretative exercise of trying to fit de re thoughts into a 
frame which, according to most commentators is fundamentally at odds with Frege’s 
distinction, McDowell assumes the more radical stance of seeking to undermine a frame 
of thought, which makes the project seem prejudged in the first place. As he says, “My 
purpose … is not to repeat or embellish Evans’s positive considerations [in favour of a 
Fregean account of de re senses], but to criticise a theoretical structure within which they 
are bound to seem incomprehensible.”302 Rather than juxtaposing the dominant view of 
Fregean sense with a standard conception of de re thoughts, McDowell’s “De Re Senses” 
presents a novel conception of what it is for a thought to be de re, which, as we will see, 
he argues is compatible with a reading of Fregean senses. 
McDowell’s criticism of what he takes to be an inhibiting framework – the standard 
conception of de re– is sketched in section three of this essay. However, can an 
alternative notion of the de re, hospitable to a Fregean notion of sense, be construed? In 
“Evans’s Frege” and “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, McDowell does 
his utmost to show how we can find room for an idea of object-dependent thought in a 
Fregean framework, and in section four of this essay I recapitulate this, McDowell’s 
more constructive attempt, at defining a notion of object-dependent thought available to a 
Fregean. 
However, this does not present a complete case for Fregean de re senses – to do that 
one would have to consider McDowell’s (and Evans’s) reading of Fregean senses. That, 
on the other hand, is an issue of great complexity, which has lead to a long-standing 
dispute between McDowell and Michael Dummett over modest versus full-blooded 
theories of meaning and would require (at least!) an essay for itself in order to be dealt 
with adequately. My aim in this paper is the more modest one of seeing how McDowell 
thinks de re, or object-dependent thought can provide a way of dispelling the generic 
problem of mind’s relation to the world.303 However, before looking at McDowell’s 
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suggestion to the opposite, what exactly is it with Frege’s distinction that supposedly 
prevents it from being made to cohere with a notion of de re thoughts?  
 
II. Balking at Fregean de re senses 
Frege introduced the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung in order to solve, among 
others, the problem of identity; how it can be that “statements of the form ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’ 
differ in ‘cognitive value’.”304 Or, in Frege’s famous example; how it can be that we 
obtain new knowledge when we come to know that the morning star, which we know as 
Hesperus, and the evening star, which we know as Phosphorous, both refer to the planet 
Venus. “Frege solves the problem”, as Avrum Stroll puts it, 
 
“by drawing a tripartite distinction between linguistic expressions, what they mean, and what they 
refer to. In effect, he is making the point that the concept of “meaning” is ambiguous: sometimes, in 
speaking about he meaning of a linguistic unit, one is speaking about its connotation or sense and 
sometimes about the reference or object it is referring to mentioning.”305 
 
By holding that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ have different senses there is no 
problem in explaining how one can acquire new knowledge by coming to know that 
Hesperus is Phosphorous – it is simply a case of coming to see the same referent under 
two different senses. This way of solving the problem differs from that of Russell. As 
Greg Fitch and Michael Nelson say, 
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“there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of theories in the philosophy of language and many versions 
of these theories. … There are the Fregean theories that employ some version of Frege's distinction 
between sense and reference and the Russellian theories that eschew this distinction.”306 
 
Instead of solving the identity problem by postulating senses, Russell, as we know, 
distinguished between logically proper names, and definite descriptions; between names 
that pick out an object directly, and which have no other meaning than the object it 
denotes, and definite description, or ‘incomplete symbols’ that pick out an object through 
its specification and which are meaningless in isolation. The first type give rise to what 
has become known as ‘Russellian propositions’ – “propositions that are about a particular 
individual in virtue of having that individual as a direct constituent”307 – whereas 
propositions containing definite descriptions can be broken down, and analyzed in terms 
of the theory of description, as Russell’s famous example with ‘the present King of 
France’ illustrates. 
However, whereas “Russell’s earliest account treat names as directly referential – 
they directly pick out an object without the intermediation of a description, or intension 
[i.e. sense] … he later construes all grammatically proper names as abbreviations of 
descriptions.”308 And, as Frege wanted senses to be objective, he sometimes speaks as if 
senses were publically available descriptions, which has led to the grouping of both 
theories as ‘description theories’ in which the idea of singular propositions has been 
obscured.309 
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However, in addition to the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, which has made 
a number of commentators argue that Frege held that one could have sense without 
reference, there is also the fact that Frege seems, in a number of places, to argue 
explicitly for that view. In the early parts of “On Sense and Reference”, as R. M. 
Sainsbury argues, “Frege admits [the possibility of sense without a referent] in 
unequivocal terms”310. In the relevant passage, Frege says that, “The expression ‘the least 
rapidly convergent series’ has a sense but demonstrably has no reference, since for every 
given convergent series, another convergent, but less rapidly convergent, series can be 
found.”311 Others, however, most notably Gareth Evans, have argued that Frege’s 
position was not so straightforward – that he equivocated in his view on the issue or, that 
in the passages where he speaks of senses without reference, it is merely as ‘mock 
thoughts’. As he argued in The Varieties of Reference, 
 
“Why did he continue to adhere to a basically Russellian view of singular terms in all his serious 
theorizing, despite his willingness to contemplate empty singular terms with a sense? The answer I think, is 
that Frege found a convenient mat under which he could sweep the problem posed for his theory by 
assigning sense to empty singular terms, a mat we might label ‘Fiction’.”312 
 
So in passages where Frege appears to concede that “sentences containing an empty 
singular term may have a sense … it does not really have a sense of the kind possessed 
by ordinary atomic sentences, because it does not function properly, it is only as if it 
functions properly.”313 Adopting much the same interpretation as Evans of those passages 
where Frege seems to say otherwise, McDowell maintains that in spite of the general 
gloominess to the contrary, “Evans has given the outline of a perfectly Fregean account 
of some sorts of de re sense”314. 
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In preparing the ground for Evans’s thought, McDowell reverts to Russell’s notion of 
singular propositions – thoughts that depend on the existence of the object they seeks to 
pick out – and distinguishes it sharply from reference by description. Adherence to the 
distinction between genuinely referring expressions and definite descriptions plays an 
important role in McDowell’s account of how Fregean senses can properly be seen to be 
object-dependent. As was noted above, McDowell believes this important Russellian idea 
can be open to a Fregean without doing harm to the distinction between Sinn and 
Bedeutung, and as such, explain how we can have de re senses. Unfortunately, however, 
the distinction has been subject to a certain fudging, a blurring of the two types of 
referring that came from focusing on a superficial parallel between them rather than their 
differences. This led to an ‘extended Theory of Descriptions’, which lumped together 
ideas that should have been kept apart, and resulted in that the important notion of a 
genuinely referring expression was lost sight of. Later, in Kripke’s important critique of 
‘description’ theories, Russellian and Fregean theories were both treated as such theories. 
In the ensuing counter-revolution, Russell’s notion of singular reference was 
rehabilitated, cleansed of some of its undesirable aspects, but the rehabilitation never 
reached Frege, which was still perceived to be caught in the old ‘descriptivism’ made 
implausible by Kripke. While McDowell seems to agree with the new, rehabilitated form 
of Russell’s notion of singular reference, he denies that this notion is out of bounds to a 
Fregean. However, as McDowell argues, to see how we get to that position we need to 
“critizise a theoretical structure within which they [i.e. de re senses] are bound to seem 
incomprehensible.”315 
 
III. The distinction between de re and de dicto 
The framework, or theoretical structure, that McDowell seeks to undermine is 
exemplified in Tyler Burge’s paper “Belief De Re”, in the distinction between de re and 
de dicto beliefs. Or, as McDowell says, in “a certain conception of the contrast between 
de re and de dicto.”316 McDowell draws up Burge’s distinction in the following way:  
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“At the level of logical form, the contrast is between de dicto attributions of, say, belief, which relate 
the believer to a “complete” (p. 343) or “completely expressed” (p. 345) proposition, and de re attributions, 
which relate the believer to a res and something less than a “complete” proposition. Underlying this 
semantic distinction is an “epistemic” distinction (pp. 345-6): this is between beliefs that are “fully 
conceptualized” (p. 345: de dicto), and beliefs “whose correct ascription places the believer in an 
appropriate nonconceptual contextual relation to objects the belief is about” (p. 346: de re).”317 
 
In essence, the contrast between de re and de dicto beliefs that McDowell attributes 
to Burge seems to be analogous to the difference drawn above between Russellian 
propositions, and the Fregean distinction between Sinn und Bedeutung – underscored, as 
he says, by a semantic and an epistemic division of that distinction. Between, on the one 
hand, fine-grained Fregean Thoughts (composed of senses) capable of dealing with 
identity problems etc., through being completely expressed (de dicto thoughts or 
utterances, as McDowell says), and Russellian propositions, i.e. incompletely expressed 
propositions, which has objects as its constituents, and as such needs the presence of that 
object to be a complete propositions (de re thoughts or utterances).318 
In addition to this distinction, McDowell argues that Burge holds a “fundamental 
intuition”, viz. that, “if a propositional attitude (or utterance) is essentially de re, that is in 
virtue of the fact that a context involving the res itself enters into determining how the 
attitude (or utterance) can be correctly described.”319 For Burge, this is supposed to show 
the incompatibility between de re thoughts and Fregean sense, but McDowell asks 
rhetorically: “why should the essentially de re, conceived in conformity with this 
intuition, be deemed inaccessible to Frege?”320 The question is supposed to invite the 
thought that the ‘essentially de re’ is only out of bounds for Frege due to Burge’s 
conception of the contrast between de re and de dicto though. That Burge’s otherwise 
correct intuition is held captive in a misguided framework; an infelicitous distinction 
between de re and de dicto, which it is the objective of “De Re Senses” to expose and 
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undermine. Once the framework falls, we may see how a Fregean thought can be de re 
while at the same time respecting Burge’s intuition. 
We can see the contours of an alternative account of the distinction between de re 
and de dicto by closely observing passages in Logical Investigations in which Frege 
emphasises the role of the context in which the utterance is made for the ‘complete 
expression’ of a thought – “how the knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the 
utterance … is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly”321, as he says. Intuitively, 
however, these passages may seem like good examples to the contrary of what McDowell 
hopes to prove. Invoking the notion of a ‘context’ as necessary for the complete 
expression of a thought seems merely to reiterate the requirement that we, as with 
Russellian propositions, must be related to, an object, in order to express a proposition in 
which that object features, and it does not seem to break the spell of the underlying 
framework captivating Burge at all. However, McDowell argues that such a reading 
comes from insensitivity to what Frege is actually saying in these passages. Although 
Frege, 
 
“is writing of thoughts that are not completely expressed by words abstracted from context of 
utterances, … he is precisely not conceding that the thoughts are not completely expressed, simpliciter. So 
where Burge speaks of res-involving context partly determining the shape of a correct de re attribution, it is 
not clear why this cannot be transposed, in the light of this passage from Frege, into a conception of how 
such a context contributes to the expression of a fully expressible but nevertheless de re thought.”322 
 
It has been argued that Frege is using the notion of ‘thoughts’, in the passages which 
McDowell relies on, in an unorthodox sense – an idea which is encouraged by Frege 
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allowing that, “if one utters a sentence containing “yesterday” one can express the same 
thought as one could have expressed on the day before by uttering a sentence containing 
“today”323 – in which the thought referred to “would be, not a Fregean thought, but a 
Russellian proposition, containing the day in question as a constituent”324. But McDowell 
charges that attributing such a reading to Frege would simply undermine the fundamental 
point of Frege’s notion of sense. It has also been claimed that Frege might inadvertently 
have slipped in his use of ‘thoughts’, but against this claim McDowell holds up Evans’s 
more charitable suggestion that we read ‘thoughts’ in these passages as “dynamic 
thoughts” – thoughts, which, as in the previous example, require that we keep track of 
time or place, and as such “preserve their identity through the necessary changes in how 
they might be expressed.”325 However, these ‘dynamic thoughts’ would not be Russellian 
propositions (in that they would not contain the day in question as an object), and the idea 
of dynamic thoughts do not therefore serve to support Burge’s claim that de re thoughts 
are out of reach for a Fregean wishing to adhere to the Sinn and Bedeutung distinction. 
On the contrary, McDowell believes that nothing of what has been noted so far shows 
that a Fregean wishing to respect the Sinn and Bedeutung distinction is barred from 
helping himself to de re thoughts, and he upholds that it seems unintelligible “why Burge 
assumes … that contextual factors must be extraneous to the expressive capacities of 
context-sensitive utterances.”326 In other words: why the res of Burge’s intuition 
discussed above must necessarily be objects, constituents of thought, as in Russellian 
propositions, and why they cannot just as well be Fregean contexts. “If we had only the 
linguistic expression of thought to consider”327, McDowell claims, it would make 
Burge’s approach mysterious. However, he says, we may glimpse an answer to Burge’s 
delusion from the “epistemic basis” laying behind Burge’s arguments. As he quotes 
Burge as saying: 
 
“The rough epistemic analogue of the linguistic notion of what is expressed by a semantically 
significant expression is the notion of a concept. Traditionally speaking, concepts are a person’s means of 
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representing objects in thought. … From a semantical viewpoint, a de dicto belief is a belief in which the 
believer is related only to a completely expressed proposition (dictum). The epistemic analogue is a belief 
that is fully conceptualized. That is, a correct ascription of the de dicto belief identifies it purely by 
reference to a “content” all of whose semantically relevant components characterize elements in the 
believer’s conceptual repertoire.”328 
 
This passage brings us to the heart of what McDowell takes to be flawed with the 
framework Burge operates under. For in maintaining, as Burge does, that, 
epistemologically understood, ‘concepts are means of representing objects in thought’, 
we see the outline of why Burge thinks that Frege is excluded from embracing de re 
thoughts. According to McDowell, the consequences of viewing concepts as means, or 
‘vehicles’ of representation as he says later329, is that,  
 
“a belief’s being fully conceptualized can mean only that it has a fully propositional content exhausted 
by some collection of thought symbols; and it would follow that there is no room for contextual factors to 
contribute to determining how such a belief may be correctly ascribed.”330 
 
This forges an obligatory separation between content and context, in that for 
something to contribute to the propositional content of a thought it would need to be a 
symbol, or a means of representation – which a context is patently not. Context is 
therefore a priori barred from contributing to the content of thought in virtue of not 
possessing the right form. But McDowell argues that this view on the relation between 
concepts and context is due to a, 
 
 “patent slide; from concepts as parts or aspects of the content of a representational state, such as a 
belief, to concepts as means of representation. In the former sense (which is non-Fregean, but for present 
purposes only harmlessly so331), concepts would indeed be analogous to what is expressed by words, as 
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Burge says. In the latter sense, they would be analogous to what does the expressing: to the words 
themselves.”332 
 
Both these views seem, as McDowell points out, to be found in Burge’s passage 
from above. In attributing the first sense of concept to Burge, McDowell seems to have in 
mind the sentence, where Burge says that, “The rough epistemic analogue of the 
linguistic notion of what is expressed by a semantically significant expression is the 
notion of a concept.” The second attribution; that concepts are the means of expression, 
is, as we have seen, stated straightforwardly in the ensuing line.333 Once we realize this 
conflation in Burge’s thinking, as McDowell says,  
 
“the direction of argument can reverse. It is not that an independently compulsory division between 
content and context undermines Frege’s wish to make a different use of the concept of expression, but 
rather the evident coherence of Frege’s remarks, with the same plausible equation between “conceptual 
content” and what can be “completely expressed”, show that Burge’s picture of the relation between 
context and content is unwarranted.”334 
 
After having painstakingly extracted what McDowell takes to be flawed with the 
standard conception of what it is for a thought to be de re, an opening seems to emerge as 
to how context can play the role of the res in Burge’s intuition – an intuition McDowell 
claimed was applicable to a Fregean theory respecting the distinction between Sinn and 
Bedeutung. What Burge’s ‘patent slide’ showed us, was a way of making it clear that 
concepts need not be symbols or ‘vehicles’ of representation in order to contribute to the 
conceptual content of a thought. In other words: that there is a way of thinking of de re 
thoughts which allows context to contribute to the “plausible equation between 
“conceptual content” and what can be “completely expressed””335 without being a means 
of representation. But what notion of “object-directed” thought are we here seeing the 
contours of? 
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IV. Defending Fregean singular propositions 
In developing a positive account on how there can be Fregean de re senses in a recent 
paper called “Evans’s Frege” McDowell starts with Russell. On what seems to be a fairly 
uncontroversial reading of Russell, McDowell notes that, by Russell’s lights, there is a 
difference in logical form between definite descriptions – forms of the kind ‘The F is G’, 
as he says – and “genuinely referring expressions – ‘logically proper names’”336, whose 
form is captured by the form “‘a is G’ (where ‘a’ marks a place for a logically proper 
name).”337 Whereas thoughts expressed by uttering sentences containing definite 
descriptions does not rely on the existence of the object in question, “sentences with 
logically proper names in subject position express thoughts (or propositions) whose 
availability to thought [does] depend on the existence of the objects referred to by the 
logically proper names.”338 Admittedly, though, there is a ‘superficial parallel’ between 
the two forms, which amounts to this: if there is an object that uniquely satisfies a 
definite description, as McDowell says, then that object also feature as the object picked 
out by a logical proper name. As such,  
 
“Both [logical forms] determine a certain object as what the thought that is being expressed concerns, 
in the sense that the truth or falsity of the thought depends on how it is with that object. Indeed, we could 
use that formulation to define a certain conception of singular reference.”339  
 
However, the parallel is no more than superficial as it ‘masks’, as McDowell says, 
that, “Where absence of a suitable object would require us to find no thought expressed if 
we assimilated the two logical forms, the Theory of Descriptions finds a thought that is 
no worse than false.”340 But the thought then really comes to this: that there is no 
unifying feature which groups the two ways of referring under one heading, or as 
McDowell says: “If we focus on this difference, we shall not be inclined to make much of 
the conception of singular reference that group definite descriptions – though only those 
that single out objects – and logically proper names together.”341 
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Nevertheless, the distinction between genuinely referring terms and definite 
descriptions has been subject to a certain fudging, or blurring, which comes precisely 
from an undue focusing on the ‘superficial parallel’ between the two forms of referring 
rather than a strict observance of their differences. We are gulled into the haze of an 
extended Theory of Descriptions by the natural thought that in cases where we cannot be 
certain of the existence of the object of our thought “one can direct thoughts at objects 
only in the way the Theory of Descriptions provide for”342 – which leaves it is a short 
step to argue that the Theory of Descriptions extends beyond its proper domain and 
branches into the province of singular propositions. It seems that even when we cannot 
verify the existence of the object we are facing, which, if we had, would allows us to 
form a singular proposition, the thought is nevertheless available to be expressed by 
treating the object as a “mere” definite description.343 This extension of the domain of the 
Theory of Descriptions may lead one to treat object-directed thought as a conjunct 
phenomena; that one’s thought of a certain object can be treated as an ‘extended 
description’, meaning that the thought either contains a singular referring expression, or, 
in the case that the object does not exist, that it contains a definite description. 
It would be interesting in this regard – although McDowell does not do so himself – 
to point to an analogy between McDowell’s attempt to draw up a genuine distinction 
between these two ways of referring and his criticism of the idea of a ‘common kind’ of 
mental state in perception: his criticism of the idea that there is a state that is common in 
both veridical seeing and hallucinating, grouping them together as perceptual phenomena 
– in short, McDowell’s disjunctivism.344 For it seems that by extending the Theory of 
Descriptions we are in reality blurring or fudging what is a disjunction of two 
phenomena; we are saying that the thought of an object ‘a’ is either a thought expressing 
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a definite description – in the case the object does not exist – or it is a thought expressing 
a singular proposition – in the case the object does exist. But this seems to be parallel to 
saying that my perception is either a case of a hallucination – in the case there is no 
object that corresponds to what I see – or it is a case of veridical seeing – in the case there 
is an object that I see. Although McDowell does not himself point to this similarity, I 
believe it would not be wholly wrong to characterize what McDowell is here doing as 
emphasising, or making us see a ‘semantic disjunctivism’, or, if the term is preferred, a 
‘referential disjunctivism’.345 
The main point of upholding a distinction between genuine referring and referring by 
description is to avoid lapsing into a descriptivism that is vulnerable to Kripke’s criticism 
of those theories.346 And in “Evans’s Frege” McDowell maintains that, “it remains the 
case that the extended Theory of Descriptions” – i.e. the theory of descriptions extended 
beyond its borders so as to include objects that could have featured in logical proper 
names had one been certain of their existence – “does not capture Russell’s view of 
genuinely subject-predicate form.”347 It is nevertheless understandable, he says, that 
 
“this should have tended to be forgotten, given how Russell’s treatment restricts, almost to the 
vanishing point, our repertoire of the kind of thoughts we can express with the help of logically proper 
names. … [However,] In this general [or extended] ‘descriptivism’, what is plausible to identify as 
Russell’s own conception of singular reference goes missing.”348 
 
This passage seems to place the blame on those following Russell, and on their 
failure to distinguish between genuinely referring terms and definite descriptions in 
Russell’s thinking, and it is therefore interesting to note that McDowell, in an earlier 
essay, goes far in putting the blame for this distortion on Russell himself. In the opening 
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phase of “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, the distinction between the 
logical form of genuinely referring terms and definite descriptions is set out in the same 
way as almost twenty years later: between on the one hand, “logically proper names 
[that] combine with predicates to express propositions that would not be available to be 
expressed at all if the objects referred to did not exist”349, and definite descriptions that 
are meaningful, whether or not the object they refer to exists. In this early paper 
McDowell characterises the idea of singular propositions as intending to make room for a 
“distinctive kind of configuration in psychological reality”350, allowing us to entertain a 
certain type of thoughts in which we stand in direct contact with the object of our 
thought. According to McDowell, “It seems clear that Russell’s conception of singular 
(object-dependent) propositions is intended in part as a contribution to psychology.”351 
However, as McDowell goes on to say, “Russell takes this psychological application of 
the idea to be possible only under a severe restriction on its scope”352, and in “Singular 
Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” it is this – Russell’s restriction on what counts as 
an object of acquaintance – that inhibits us from seeing the liberating potential of singular 
propositions and how they can be made to cohere with a Fregean system, and not 
necessarily the blurring of the distinction between genuinely referring terms and 
descriptions. 
The two points are nevertheless related; as we have just seen, McDowell concedes 
that Russell’s restriction makes logical proper names a curious notion, motivating an 
extension of the Theory of Descriptions. But rather than extending the Theory of 
Descriptions, and thereby blurring the distinction, we should look for a way to liberalize 
Russell’s view on what counts as an object suitable for a singular proposition. As 
McDowell says, “I believe a version of Russell’s idea can help with some venerable 
philosophical difficulties about the relation between thought and reality; but first we must 
see how its direct psychological application can be detached from Russell’s 
restriction.”353 A restriction which amounts to 
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 “refusing to accept that there can be an illusion of understanding an apparently singular sentence (or 
utterance), involving the illusion of entertaining a singular proposition expressed by it, when, since there is 
no suitably related object, there is no such proposition to be available to be entertained.”354 
 
To see how Russell’s restriction inhibits the full potential of an interesting and 
forceful conception of singular propositions, that ‘may help with some venerable 
philosophical difficulties’, we can note the following line of thought. Refusing to accept 
that there can be illusions in entertaining singular propositions means – as we saw above 
– that whenever the possibility of such an illusions arise, “the apparatus of the Theory of 
Descriptions is brought to bear, in order to equip sentences (or utterances) of the range 
with non-singular propositions that they can be understood to express whether or not 
there is a suitably related object.”355 In other words: whenever we entertain thoughts 
containing objects whose existence we cannot place beyond all doubt, the thought we 
thereby entertain is ‘extended’ to a thought containing a definite description. Now, a 
central element of Russell’s theory is that the only objects of which we can be certain of 
their existence – and thereby certain that we are not facing an illusion – are objects we 
can be acquainted with. However, as Russell held a very strict view on what counted as 
an instance of acquaintance, there were in fact very few things, under this conception, 
with which we could be said to be acquainted, and thereby very little that could be said to 
enter into genuinely referring thoughts. As McDowell says, 
 
“On his official account of acquaintance, one is acquainted only with things that figure in one’s 
immediate consciousness, conceived in a rather Cartesian way: bits of the sensory given, bits of what is 
given with similar immediacy in recollection, and (as long as Russell believes in it) one’s own self.”356 
 
So, once we move outside the sphere of what goes on in our immediate 
consciousness we can therefore no longer be said to be acquainted with the objects of our 
thoughts, and the threat of an illusion is introduced, thereby invoking the extended 
Theory of Descriptions. But this, as we have seen, would be to bring in the Theory of 
Description too soon, and to enlarge it in an inappropriate way.  
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However, extending the Theory of Descriptions is not the only option available – as 
we have seen, it would in fact be to discard Russell’s important insight of the possibility 
of entertaining singular propositions – and in the wake of Kripke’s influential attack, 
 
“much theorising about singular thought and its expression came to focus on certain contextual 
relations, typically of a causal character, in which objects can stand to episodes of thought and speech. In a 
newly dominant conception of how singular reference works, directing thoughts at objects by exploiting 
such relations replaced targeting thoughts on objects as those that conform to specifications.”357 
 
This reaction, as McDowell says, comes to a rediscovery of some of the neglected 
parts of Russell’s theory, in which the notion of acquaintance is liberated from its 
inhibiting restriction. As such, it coincides with McDowell’s pronounced aim of 
‘detaching’ Russell’s notion of singular reference from the restriction he submits it to – 
an aim that in fact seems to be a necessary step in McDowell’s further objective of 
providing a way of explaining how Fregean senses can be object-dependent.358 According 
to McDowell, although  “Russell allows as objects of perceptual acquaintance only 
features of sense-data … we can extract the notion of acquaintance from the 
epistemological framework, and apply it to at least some perceptual relations between 
minds and ordinary objects.”359 The move has the effect of undermining Russell’s 
restriction that only objects with which we are acquainted can occupy an epistemically 
privileged position making singular propositions immune to illusion. Although this shift 
in the scope of singular reference plays a central role in his historical reconstruction, 
McDowell does not really argue for this, but simply dismisses Russell’s sense-datum 
theory as implausible, arguing that “There is no independent justification, from general 
epistemology, for refusing to allow that there can be illusions of entertaining singular 
propositions.”360 
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Nevertheless, although we can liberalize Russell’s thought on singular propositions 
such that it can be brought into contact with its modern notational variant – thereby 
arguably circumvent Kripke’s criticism – the line back to Russell, or so McDowell 
claims, is generally overlooked by its new proponents. Moreover, the idea is taken to be 
in conflict with Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, as Frege is seen as a 
representative of the old descriptivism which is undermined by Kripke’s critique, and it is 
therefore maintained that Frege’s idea that Sinn determines Bedeutung “at most partly 
determine which objects thoughts concern, needing extraneous help in singling out 
objects from causal relations between thinkers and objects, now conceived as obtaining 
outside the sphere of a subject’s rationality.”361 On the other hand, McDowell and Evans 
argue that the rediscovery of Russell’s conception of singular propositions is compatible 
with Frege’s distinction. As McDowell says, “The main interest of Evans’s exploitation 
of Frege lies in its rejecting this picture”362 – a picture, which prevents that insight. 
Seeing how this idea is supposed to be incompatible with the Fregean framework – 
or alternatively, how it, on McDowell and Evans’s account, can be made to fit – takes us 
once more back to the difference between Frege and Russell. Whereas “Russell 
formulates his conception of genuinely subject-predicate form by speaking of 
propositions in which objects themselves figure as constituents”363, which, as we saw, 
would have the consequence that “there could not be two such propositions in which the 
same property is attributed to the same object”364, Frege explained how we could 
nevertheless have two such thoughts through the introduction of sense. As McDowell 
notes, “Frege’s aim is to provide for thoughts about objects to be individuated more 
finely than by the objects they are about.”365 Although this is normally taken to prove that 
Frege could not hold that thoughts are de re, or object-dependent McDowell sees it 
differently, and argues that, “That formulation [i.e. that thoughts are to be individuated 
more finely than the objects they are about] uses a neutral notion of a thought’s being 
about an object. Nothing”, as he goes on to say, “prevents its being applied to thoughts 
that are about objects in the ‘Russellian’ sense that they depend on the objects for their 
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existence.”366 So, on McDowell’s account, at the very least, Frege’s says nothing that 
exclude us from seeing thoughts as dependent on the existence of the object they are 
about. 
McDowell concedes that it may be somewhat hard to see the possibility he here 
envisages. That “Within Russell’s restricted range, it is hard to see how there could be 
pairs of cases like those Frege exploits to argue that we need a finer individuation of 
thought”367, i.e. cases of identity, where the same object is attributed the same property. 
However, “once Russell’s restriction is lifted … as in the conception of reference that has 
supplanted ‘descriptivism’ as the dominant position, it becomes clearer that object-
dependence in thought is not, of itself alien to the Fregean framework.”368 McDowell 
suggests the view that, 
 
“There is nothing to prevent us from contemplating rational subjects who combine beliefs and 
disbeliefs in whose content the same predication is made of the same object – the sort of combination that 
recommended the Fregean apparatus – even though the contents that Fregean considerations require us to 
differentiate are contents whose being thinkable at all require the existence of the object.”369  
 
And as he rounds off the passage by claiming, in a phrase that summarises his 
suggestion of how Fregean senses may be de re: 
 
“A proposition can be object-dependent even though its identity is determined not by the Bedeutung 
but by the Sinn of a singular term used in giving expression to it.”370 
 
Although it takes us into McDowell’s discussion of sense – which I have tried to 
keep out of the paper – the idea of how a proposition can be object-depended and at the 
same time determined by the Sinn of a singular proposition, seems, without a brief look at 
his notion of sense, rather mysterious. So under the pretext of fascilitating an 
understanding of how a context is supposed to be able to act as the res, I’ll briefly go 
beyond the self-set scope of the paper. 
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In “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name”, McDowell notes a distinction in 
how to understand ‘the reference of x’ – knowledge which was a requirement for being 
acquainted with an object, and hence, a requirement for entertaining a singular 
proposition. As McDowell says, 
 
“A phrase of the form “the reference of x” can be understood as equivalent to the corresponding 
phrase of the form “what x refers to”, either (i) in the sense in which “what” amounts to “that which” 
(which yields the official Fregean use of “Bedeutung”) or (ii) in the sense in which “what” is an 
interrogative pronoun. In this second sense, “what x refers to” gives the form of an indirect question, 
something suitable to follow “know” where knowledge of truths is what is meant. Knowledge of the 
reference of a name, in this second (non-Fregean) sense, could reasonably be held to be knowledge that, in 
the context of further knowledge not itself involving the name, would suffice for understanding utterances 
containing the name – that is, precisely, knowledge of its sense.”371 
 
And as McDowell goes on to say, 
 
“The possibility of equating a distinction between sense and (Fregean) reference with a distinction 
between (non-Fregean) reference and referent may, for those who are at home in the latter idiom, make it 
easier to see how crediting names with senses … is not necessarily crediting them with anything like 
connotation or descriptive meaning.”372 
 
But this gives us just what we needed, for if we adopt the second understanding 
McDowell here sketches, we have a way in which knowledge of ‘the reference of x’ – 
although in a non-Fregean manner – does not require the acquaintance of the object to 
which x refers, but knowledge of its sense. In other words, that we may have knowledge 
of ‘the reference of x’ (in a non-Fregean manner) if we know the sense of x (in a Fregean 
manner), as he says in the last quote here given. But this allows that not just objects but 
senses may be the res of a de re thought, which is what McDowell says above in saying 
that: “A proposition can be object-dependent even though its identity is determined not 
by the Bedeutung but by the Sinn of a singular term used in giving expression to it.” 
And as McDowell argues, quoting Frege from Logical Inquiries, the complete expression 
of a thought may depend on the context in which it is uttered, meaning that the context 
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would be instrumental in providing the ‘knowledge of x’ in the second sense mentioned – 
that the context would be the res, making the thought a de re or ‘object-dependent’ 
thought.  
 
V. Conclusion 
So what have we seen so far? I started by saying that we, in McDowell’s semantic works, 
seem to find a semantic solution to the generic problem of how the mind is related to the 
world. As McDowell ends “Evans’s Frege” by saying, 
 
“Evans’s Frege enables a synthesis between acknowledging that contextual relations between subjects 
and objects matter for determining the contents of thoughts, on the one hand, and giving full weight to the 
idea that thinking is an exercise of rationality, on the other. This can be seen as a substantial contribution to 
a project that goes back at least to Kant, and that is beset with difficulties in the intellectual environment of 
modern philosophy: integrating our rational powers with our natural situatedness in the world.”373 
 
As McDowell is here saying, Evans’s Frege presents a substantial contribution to the 
problem of how to integrate mind in world, which is precisely the problem that occupies 
him in Mind and World – although McDowell in that work probes the problem from its 
epistemological formulation: how can experience justify beliefs? The semantic works 
queries the generic problem in a semantical form: how can there be de re senses? 
The first step in his attempt to explain how there can be de re senses, and hence, that 
there is no problem in explaining the relation between mind and world once we see things 
straight, is to undermine a framework that inhibits the idea of de re senses in the first 
place. This framework comes out in Burge’s view of the distinction between de re and de 
dicto thoughts, which hinges on the misconception that the res of a de re thought must be 
an object of thought in the Russellian sense: that the res must be of the form that it can 
enter as a constituent of a proposition. However, according to McDowell, this 
misconception is due to a slide in Burge’s thinking between seeing concepts, as 
McDowell puts it, as ‘what is expressed by words’, to seeing them as means or vehicles 
of representation. In the first sense, they are constituents of Fregean Thoughts374; in the 
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second, concepts are building blocks of Russellian propositions. Pointing to this slide in 
Burge’s thinking is supposed to undermine the framework that the res of a de re thought 
– or alternatively, the ‘object’ of an object-dependent thought – must be understood as a 
constituent of a proposition; that it, on the contrary, may be a sense partaking in the 
constitution of a Fregean Thought. As such, McDowell’s solution to the question of how 
there can be de re senses is visible in “De Re Senses”, although the paper is mainly 
directed to undermining the standard conception of what it is for a thought to be de re. 
In his more constructive attempt of replacing or expanding the notion of de re, 
presented in “Evans’s Frege”, McDowell seeks to recover Russell’s notion of singular 
reference (object-dependent reference), and show that it is open to a Fregean by arguing 
that although Sinn is introduced to allow thoughts to individuate more finely than the 
objects they are about, it does not mean that the thoughts are thereby complete or 
independent of the ‘objects’ they are about. In some cases, as Frege concedes, a context is 
necessary in order to complete a thought, meaning that the thought is dependent upon the 
context, turning the thought into a de re thought in the sense that the context plays the 
role of the ‘res’ needed to complete the thought. As such, we have a way in which there 
can be de re senses. 
However, McDowell’s work is not meant to prove that we must conceive Fregean 
senses this way, only that there is nothing that prevents us from allowing senses to be de 
re; that such an interpretation is not in conflict with the Fregean distinction between Sinn 
Bedeutung. So although McDowell may here be said to give a compelling case of how 
singular propositions may be employed in a framework of Fregean senses, it is not an 
argument that forces such a reading as the only correct. Nor is it clear that Frege himself 
saw matters this way, and McDowell’s approach, especially his exposition in “Evans’s 
Frege”, seems to be hedged with qualifications which indicates that McDowell would be 
happy to argue for a weaker claim: that fitting singular thought in Frege’s distinction 
between Sinn and Bedeutung is an option open to a Fregean. As he says in a footnote, 
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“the present point is just that nothing in the idea of ways of thinking of objects, conceived 
as individuated on Fregean principles, excludes their being object dependent.”375 
A full account of Fregean de re senses would have to address what Frege means by 
‘sense’ – an issue that would open the floodgates to the heated, and long-standing debate 
between McDowell and Michael Dummett over modest versus full-blooded theories of 
meaning, and it is an issue that would involve us in a lot more work than it would be 
possible to deal with here. The present has only been an attempt at making it plausible to 
see how there can be de re senses. If there is such a possibility, we have a semantic 
‘solution’ to the generic problem of how mind can be related to the world. How, as we 
saw in essay I, and again in essay II, we may undermine a picture of the mind common to 
both coherentism and ‘Givenism’ – which argues that the realm of nature, conceived as 
the realm of law, and the space of reasons, are of different kinds, thereby generating the 
problem of mind’s relation to the world 376 – by arguing that we can conceive of de re 
senses. As McDowell ends “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” by saying, 
 
“The point of the conception of singular thought that I have been recommending is 
that it treats the Cartesian fear of loss [of the world] in a different, and fully satisfying 
way: not by trying to bridge a gulf between intentionality and objects, nor by a cavalier 
refusal to worry about the problem, while leaving what poses it undisturbed, but by 
fundamentally undermining the picture of mind that generates the Cartesian divide.”377
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